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Abstract
Differential privacy is a de facto standard for statistical computations over databases that
contain private data. The strength of differential privacy lies in a rigorous mathematical defini-
tion which guarantees individual privacy and yet allows for accurate statistical results. Thanks
to its mathematical definition, differential privacy is also a natural target for formal analysis.
A broad line of work uses logical methods for proving privacy. However, these methods are
not complete, and only partially automated. A recent and complementary line of work uses
statistical methods for finding privacy violations. However, the methods only provide statistical
guarantees (but no proofs).
We propose the first decision procedure for checking differential privacy of a non-trivial class
of probabilistic computations. Our procedure takes as input a program P parametrized by a
privacy budget ǫ and either proves differential privacy for all possible values of ǫ, or gener-
ates a counterexample. In addition, our procedure applies both to ǫ-differential privacy and
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Technically, the decision procedure is based on a novel and judicious
encoding of the semantics of programs in our class into a decidable fragment of the first-order
theory of the reals with exponentiation. We implement our procedure and use it for (dis)proving
privacy bounds for many well known examples, including randomized response, histogram, re-
port noisy max and sparse vector.
1 Introduction
Differential privacy [16] is a gold standard for privacy of statistical computations. Differential
privacy ensures that running the algorithm on any two “adjacent” databases yields two “approxi-
mately” equal distributions, where two databases are adjacent if they differ in a single element, and
two distributions are approximately equivalent if their distance is small w.r.t. some metric speci-
fied by privacy parameter ǫ and error parameter δ. Thus, differential privacy delivers a very strong
form of individual privacy. Yet, and somewhat surprisingly, it is possible to develop differentially
private algorithms for many tasks. Moreover, the algorithms are useful, in the sense that their
results have reasonable accuracy. However, designing differentially private algorithms is difficult
and the privacy analysis can be error-prone, as witnessed by the example of sparse vector. This
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difficulty has motivated the development of formal approaches for analyzing differentially private
algorithms; see [7] for a survey and the related work section of this paper.
Even though significant advances have been made in identifying proof principles to establish
differential privacy [27, 19, 8, 6, 4, 30, 14, 1] and techniques have been proposed to find differential
privacy violations [15, 10], foundational questions regarding decidability of differential privacy and
identification of decidable classes of programs/algorithms have not yet been investigated. It is
critically important to answer these foundational questions on automated formal verification of
differential privacy. This paper presents, for the first time, important results on these problems.
Our first result establishes that checking differential privacy is computationally undecidable even for
simple programs. While this result may not come as surprising, it sets the stage for the remainder
of our work.
The main thrust of this paper is, therefore, to identify a rich class of programs, that encompasses
many known examples, for which checking differential privacy is decidable for all possible instances
of the privacy parameter ǫ (throughout the paper, we assume that the error parameter δ is defined
as a function of ǫ). Since our undecidability result applies to really simple programs, identifying
practically relevant decidable fragments is challenging. This is so not only due to presence of
variables ranging over infinite, but also due to the privacy parameter ǫ and that we are checking
differential privacy for all ǫ > 0.
We focus our attention on programs whose input and output spaces are finite. Note that
such programs need not be finite state, as they could use program variables ranging over infinite
domains, to carry out the computation. We introduce a class of programs, called DiPWhile, which
are probabilistic while programs, for which the problem of checking differential privacy is decidable.
We succeed in carefully balancing decidability and expressivity, by judiciously delineating the use
of real-valued and integer-valued variables. Our results apply both to finite-state and infinite-state
programs given in DiPWhile and parameterized by ǫ.
Our decidability proof for programs in DiPWhile is based on the following results. The first result
is that the semantics of DiPWhile-programs can be defined using parametrized, finite-state Markov
chains 1. This is achieved by judiciously delineating the use of continuous and discrete variables. At
a high level, these integer and real random variables are only used for tracking the control-flow of the
program (typically conditionals) but not the data-flow of the program, leading to the final output.
For such programs, one can use a symbolic representation of real and integer random variables, and
resolve the symbolic representation when computing the guards of conditionals. This simple idea
is sufficient to cover prominent examples such as Report Noisy Max and Sparse Vector Technique,
and may be of independent interest. Second, we establish the non-trivial result that the transition
probabilities of the Markov chain are ratios of polynomials in both ǫ and eǫ. These two observation
together, allow us to reduce the problem of checking differential privacy of DiPWhile-programs to
the decidable fragment of the first order theory of reals with exponentials, identified by McCallum
and Weispfenning [25].
Our decision procedure has two complementary uses. The first use of the procedure is a stand
alone tool for checking ǫ- or (ǫ, δ(ǫ))-differential privacy of mechanisms specified by DiPWhile-
programs, for all values of ǫ. We have implemented our decision procedure in a tool that we
call DiPC (Differential Privacy Checker). Given DiPWhile-program, our tool constructs a sen-
tence in McCallum-Weispfenning fragment of the theory of reals with exponentials. It then calls
1A parametrized Markov chain is a Markov chain whose transition probabilities are a function of the privacy
budget.
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Mathematica R©to check if the constructed sentence is true over the reals. Since our decision proce-
dure is the first that can both prove differential privacy and detect its violation, we tried the tool on
examples that known to be differentially private and those that are known to be not differentially
private, including variants of Sparse Vector, Report Noisy Max, and Histograms. DiPC successfully
checked differential privacy for the former class of examples and produced counterexamples for the
later class. Our counter-examples are exact (rather than probabilistic) and are more compact than
those delivered by prior tools.
A complementary use of the decision procedure is for validating counter examples for algorithms
with infinite input or output sets. Our approach can be used to check ǫ-differential privacy of any
mechanism for a given pair of adjacent input values and a given output value, for all values of
ǫ > 0, or for a given value of ǫ > 0. It can also be used to find violations of programs with
unbounded outputs. For such programs, it is possible to discretize the output domain into a finite
domain, and to use the decision procedure to find privacy violations for the discretized algorithm
(by post-processing, privacy violations for the discretized algorithms are also privacy violations for
the original algorithm). Such usages complement the technique presented in [15] that proposes a
method for generating counter examples. The approach of [15] is statistical in nature, and the
examples generated by it are highly probable to be counter examples (with statistical guarantees),
but may not be definite counter examples. Our approach can be used to check if the counter
examples, generated by their tool, are real counter examples, for a given value of ǫ.
Overall, our results are complementary to prior works. Our focus is clearly more foundational,
in the sense that we consider decidability problems, whereas prior works develop sound methods
for proving or disproving privacy. Addressing foundational questions is obviously a natural goal
for verification. However, we also contend that our results are practically interesting: while they
cannot deliver scalable tools in the same way that approaches based on couplings or hypothesis
testing could, they can be used to automatically verify the privacy of algorithms on small inputs
for all values of the privacy parameter ǫ. This can provide valuable information for algorithm
designers.
Contributions
We summarize our key contributions.
• We prove the undecidability of the problem of checking differential privacy of very simple
programs, including those that have a single Boolean input and output.
• We prove decidability of differential privacy for an interesting class of programs. Our method
is fully automatic that can check both differential privacy and detect its violation by gener-
ating counterexamples. To the best of our knowledge this is the first such result.
• We implement the decision procedure and evaluate our approach on private and non-private
examples of the literature.
Due to lack of space, some proofs and other material have been moved to an Appendix which
has been uploaded as an anonymous submission.
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Related Work
The main thread of work has focused on formal systems for proving that an algorithm is differen-
tially private. Such systems are helpful because they rule out the possibility of mistakes in privacy
analyses. Reed and Pierce [27] propose the first programming language technique for proving dif-
ferential privacy, in the form of a linear type system. Gaboardi et al [19] later enrich their approach
with linear dependent types, in order to support recursion and a broader set of differentially pri-
vate constructions. Azevedo de Amorim et al [14] propose another extension to accommodate
(ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. However, it is not possible to verify some of the most advanced exam-
ples, such as sparse vector or vertex cover, using these type systems. Moreover, type-checking
and type-inference for linear (dependent) types is challenging. Barthe et al [8, 6, 4] develop sev-
eral program logics for reasoning about differential privacy. These logics construct approximate
probabilistic couplings between two program executions on adjacent inputs. These couplings are
parametrized by a binary relation on program outputs; when specialized to the equality relations,
these approximate probabilistic couplings coincide with the notion of approximate equality used in
differential privacy. These logics have been used successfully to analyze many classic examples from
the literature, including the sparse vector technique. However, these logics are limited: they cannot
disprove privacy; extensions may be required for specific examples; building proofs is challenging.
The last issue has been addressed by Zhang and Kifer [30] and by Albarghouthi and Hsu [1]. These
works propose automated methods for proving automatically differential privacy. Zhang and Kifer
introduce randomness alignments as an alternative to couplings, and build a dependent type system
that tracks randomness alignments. Automation is then achieved by type inference. Albarghouthi
and Hsu propose coupling strategies, which rely on a fine-grained notion of variable approximate
coupling which draws inspiration both from approximate couplings and randomness alignment.
They synthesize coupling strategies by considering an extension of Horn clauses with probabilistic
coupling constraints, and developing algorithms to solve such constraints. However, these methods
are limited to vanilla ǫ-differential privacy and do not accommodate bounds that are obtained by
advanced composition (since δ 6= 0). Recently, Liu, Wang, and Zhang [23] develop a probabilistic
model checking approach for verifying differential properties. Their approach is based on modelling
differential private programs as Markov chains. Their encoding is more direct than ours (i.e. it
assumes that a finite-state Markov chain is given) and they do not provide a decision procedure
with real and integer variables. Furthermore, the DTMCs are not parameterized by ǫ. Chistikov
and Murawski and Purser [13] propose an elegant method based on skewed Kantorovich distance
for checking differential privacy of Markov chains. However, their approach is rather theoretical
and not implemented.
A dual problem is to find automatically violations of differential privacy. This is useful to help
privacy practitioners discover as early as possible potential problems in their algorithms. Two
recent and concurrent works by Ding et al [15] and Bischel et al [10] develop automated methods
for finding privacy violations. Ding et al propose an approach which combines purely statistical
methods based on hypothesis testing and symbolic execution. Bischel et al develop an approach
based on a combination of optimization methods and language-specific techniques for computing
differentiable approximations of privacy estimations. Both methods are fully automated. Moreover,
both methods can only be used for concrete numerical values of the privacy budget ǫ. As previously
explained, our work improves is complementary to these approaches, in the sense that our decision
procedure can be used to verify their proposed counter-examples (for algorithms that fall in the
class of programs handled by the procedure).
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2 Primer on differential privacy
Differential privacy [16] is a rigorous definition and framework for private statistical data mining.
In this model, a trusted curator with access to the database returns answers to queries made by
possibly dishonest data analysts that do not have access to the database. The task of the curator
is to return probabilistically noised answers, so that data analysts cannot distinguish between two
databases are adjacent, i.e. only differ in the value of a single individual. There are two common
definitions: two databases are adjacent if they are exactly the same except for the presence or
absence of one record, or for the difference in one record. We abstract away from any particular
definition of adjacency.
Henceforth, we denote the set of real numbers, rational numbers, natural numbers and integers
by R,Q,N, and Z respectively. The Euler constant shall be denoted by e. We assume given a set
U of inputs, and a set V of outputs. A randomized function P from U to V is a function that takes
an input in U and returns a distribution over V. For a measurable set S ⊆ V, the probability that
the output of P on u is in the set S shall be denoted by Prob(P (u) ∈ S). In the case the output
set is discrete, we use Prob(P (u) = v) as shorthand for Prob(P (u) = {v}).
We are now ready to define differential privacy. We assume that U is equipped with a binary
symmetric relation Φ ⊆ U × U , which we shall call the adjacency relation. We say that u1, u2 ∈ U
are adjacent if (u1, u2) ∈ Φ.
Definition 1. Let ǫ ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. Let Φ ⊆ U × U be an adjacency relation. Let P be a
randomized function with inputs from U and outputs in V. We say that P is (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private with respect to Φ if for all measurable subsets S ⊆ V and u, u′ ∈ U such that (u, u′) ∈ Φ,
Prob(P (u) ∈ S) ≤ eǫ Prob(P (u′) ∈ S) + δ
As usual, we say that P is ǫ-differentially private iff it is (ǫ, 0)-differentially private. If the output
domain is discrete, it is equivalent to require that for all v ∈ V and u, u′ ∈ U such that (u, u′) ∈ Φ,
Prob(P (u) = v) ≤ eǫ Prob(P (u′) = v)
Differential privacy is preserved by post-processing. Concretely, if P is an (ǫ, δ)-differentially
private computation from U to V, and h : V → W is a deterministic function, then h ◦ P is an
(ǫ, δ)-differentially private computation from U to W. In the remainder, we shall exploit post-
processing to connect differential privacy of randomized computations with infinite output spaces
to differential privacy of their discretizations.
Laplace Mechanism
The Laplace mechanism [16] achieves differential privacy for numerical computations by adding
random noise to outputs. Given ǫ > 0 and mean µ, let Lap(ǫ, µ) be the continuous distribution
whose probability density function (p.d.f.) is given by
fǫ,µ(x) =
ǫ
2
e−ǫ|x−µ|.
Lap(ǫ, µ) is said to be the Laplacian distribution with mean µ and scale parameter 1ǫ . Consider a
real-valued function q : U → R. Assume that q is k-sensitive w.r.t. an adjacency relation Φ on U ,
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i.e. for every pair of adjacent values u1 and u2, |q(u1) − q(u2)| ≤ k. Then the computation that
maps u to Lap( ǫk , q(u)) is ǫ-differentially private.
It is sometimes convenient to consider the discrete version of the Laplace distribution. Given
ǫ > 0 and mean µ, let DLap(ǫ, µ) be the discrete distribution on Z, the set of integers, whose
probability mass function (p.m.f.) is given by
fǫ,µ(i) =
1− e−ǫ
1 + e−ǫ
e−ǫ|i−µ|.
DLap(ǫ, µ) is said to be the discrete Laplacian distribution with mean µ and scale parameter 1ǫ .
The discrete Laplace mechanism achieves the same privacy guarantees as the continuous Laplace
mechanism.
Exponential mechanism
The Exponential mechanism [26] is used for making non-numerical computations private. The
mechanism takes as input a value u from some input domain and a scoring function F : U ×V → R
and outputs a discrete distribution over V. Formally, given ǫ > 0 and u ∈ U , the discrete distribution
Exp(ǫ, F, u) on V is given by the probability mass function:
hǫ,F,u(v) =
eǫF (u,v)∑
v∈V e
ǫF (u,v)
.
Suppose that the scoring function is k-sensitive w.r.t. some adjacency relation Φ on U , i.e.,
for all for each pair of adjacent values u1 and u2 and v ∈ V, |F (u1, r) − F (u2, r)| ≤ k. Then the
exponential mechanism is (2kǫ, 0)-differentially private w.r.t. Φ.
3 Motivating Examples
Before presenting the mathematical details of our results, let us informally present our method by
showing how it would work on some illustrative examples.
Randomized Response Mechanism Randomized Response mechanism was originally em-
ployed by social scientists in surveys to collect meaningful information from subjects who may
be embarrassed to give truthful answers to a “Yes/No” question. Thus, they are told to answer
the question by first flipping a coin and then answer truthfully/untruthfully depending upon if the
coin turns up heads/tails respectively. In the context of differential privacy, randomized response
mechanism is used to privately report answers to a Boolean query. The privacy guarantees of the
mechanism depends on the probability of the random coin turning up heads. Consider two ver-
sions of this algorithm in Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2. For both these algorithms, the integer N
represents the total number of answers and the array q of length N stores the Boolean answers.
The array out stores the output array. We assume that the answer Yes is represented by ⊤ and the
answer No is represented by ⊥. Observe that the probability of the coin tosses in both Algorithms
is a function of ǫ. We further assume that the privacy budget, ǫ, is in the interval (0, 1). This
assumption is needed for Algorithm 2.
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Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
for i← 1 to N do
out[i] ←
{
q[i] with probability = e
ǫ
1+eǫ
¬q[i] with probability = 11+eǫ
end
Algorithm 1: Differentially Private Randomized
Response (Rand1)
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
for i← 1 to N do
out[i] ←
{
q[i] with probability = 1+ǫ2
¬q[i] with probability = 1−ǫ2
end
Algorithm 2: Non-Differentially Private Ran-
domized Response (Rand2)
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
rT ← Lap(
ǫ
2∆ , T )
count← 0
for i← 1 to N do
r← Lap( ǫ4c∆ , q[i])
b← r ≥ rT
if b then
out[i]← ⊤
count← count+ 1
if count ≥ c then
exit
end
else
out[i]← ⊥
end
end
Algorithm 3: SVT algorithm (SVT1)
Given N , the input set U in this context is the set of N length vectors q, where the kth element
q[k] represents the answer to the kth answer. The adjacency relation Φ on inputs is defined as
follows: q1 and q2 are adjacent if and only if q1[i] and q2[i] differ at exactly one position.
Now, consider the case when N = 2. For these algorithms there are 4 possible inputs and
outputs [⊤,⊤], [⊤,⊥], [⊥,⊥] and [⊥,⊤]. Our approach is to compute, for each input x and output
y, the probability of returning y when the input is x. Note that this probability depends on the
parameter ǫ, and so what we are looking for is a symbolic representation of this function. Let us
consider the adjacent inputs, q1 = [⊤,⊤] and q2 = [⊤,⊥]. Consider the output out = [⊤,⊤] Let
r1/r2 be the probability that Algorithm 1 outputs out on input q1/q2 respectively. It is easy to see
that
r1 =
e2ǫ
(1 + eǫ)2
and r2 =
eǫ
(1 + eǫ)2
.
The corresponding probabilities for Algorithm 2 are
r1 =
(1 + ǫ)2
4
and r2 =
1− ǫ2
4
.
Our immediate goal is to compute expressions like r1, r2 automatically from the given program,
the adjacent inputs, and outputs. We will show later how this can be achieved by converting the
program into a finite-state Discrete Time Markov Chain (DTMC) (See Section 5) whose transition
probabilities are functions parametrized by ǫ. The set of states of the discrete time DTMC is the set
of pairs of program locations and the valuations over program variables. The transition function is
defined as expected.
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Having computed such expressions, checking ǫ-differential privacy requires one to determine if
for all ǫ ∈ (0, 1). (r1 ≤ e
ǫr2) and for all ǫ > 0. (r2 ≤ e
ǫr1).
Notice that the above conditions can be encoded as a first order sentence with exponentials;
and checking if ǫ-differential privacy holds, reduces to determining if such a first order sentence
is true for reals, with the standard interpretation of multiplication, addition, and exponentiation.
Whether there is a decision procedure that can determine the truth of first order sentences involving
exponentials over the reals, is a long standing open problem. However, a decidable fragment of
such an extended first order theory has been identified by McCallum and Weispfenning [25]. The
probabilities computed above for Algorithm 1 and for Algorithm 2 both yield first order sentences
in this decidable fragment. Thus, we can check automatically if these sentences are true. (The
formula turns out to be true for Algorithm 1 and false for Algorithm 2). Indeed, we will exploit this
decision procedure similarly in our first result (See Theorem 9) that shows that differential privacy
is decidable for examples in which the randomized choices involve only finite discrete distributions
with transition probabilities that can be defined in the decidable fragment identified in [25].
Sparse Vector Technique Many differential privacy examples, however, require that the ran-
domized algorithms sample from infinite support distributions (including continuous distributions).
Consider the Sparse Vector Technique (SVT) [17, 24]. The Sparse Vector Technique was designed
to answer multiple ∆-sensitive numerical queries in a differentially private fashion. The relevant
information we want from queries is, which amongst them are above a threshold T . If we apply a
differentially private mechanism to answer each one of them separately then the privacy budget ex-
plodes (answering k such queries in an ǫ-differentially private manner would only be kǫ-differentially
private). The Sparse Vector Technique as given in Algorithm 3 is designed to identify the first c
queries that are above the threshold T in an ǫ-differentially private fashion.
In the program, the integer N represents the total number of queries and the array q of length
N represents the answers to queries. The array out represents the output array, ⊥ represents False
and ⊤ represents True. We assume that initially the constant ⊥ is stored at each position in out. In
the SVT technique, the true answers account for most of the privacy cost and we can only answer
c of them until we run out of the privacy budget [17, 30]. On the other hand, there is no restriction
to the false answers that can be given.
Given N , the input set U in this context is the set of N length vectors q, where the kth element
q[k] represents the answer to the kth query on the original database. The adjacency relation Φ
on inputs is defined as follows: q1 and q2 are adjacent if and only if |q1[i] − q2[i]| ≤ 1 for each
1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Let us consider an instance of the SVT algorithm when T = 0, N = 2, ∆ = 1 and c = 1. Let
us assume that all array elements in q come from the domain {0, 1}. In this case, we have four
possible inputs [0, 0], [0, 1], [1, 1], and [1, 0], and three possible outputs [⊥,⊥], [⊤,⊥], and [⊥,⊤].
For example, the probability of outputting [⊥,⊤] on input [0, 1] can be computed as follows.
Let XT be a random variable with Laplacian distribution Lap(
ǫ
2 , 0)), X1 be a random variable
with Laplacian distribution Lap( ǫ4 , 0) and X2 be the random variable with Laplacian distribution
Lap( ǫ4 , 1). The probability of outputting [⊥,⊤] is the product of outputting of outputting ⊥ first,
which is Prob(X1 < X0), and the conditional probability of outputting ⊤ given that ⊥ is output,
which is Prob(X2 ≥ X0|X1 < X0). Note that we really require the second quantity to be conditional
probability as the events X1 < X0 and X2 ≥ X0 are not independent. This probability can be
8
computed to be
r1 =
24e
3ǫ
4 − 1 + 8e
ǫ
4 + 21e
ǫ
2
48e
3ǫ
4
.
Similarly, when the input is [1, 1] and the output is [⊥,⊤], the probability is given by
r2 =
−22 + 32e
ǫ
4 − 3ǫ
48e
ǫ
2
.
Similar to the randomized response example above, checking differential privacy again reduces
to determining if such a first order sentence is true for reals, with the standard interpretation of
multiplication, addition, and exponentiation. However, this examples raises two questions. The
first is how to compute the probability of producing a given output on a given input. Note again
that the probability here is really a function of ǫ. Further, even if these probabilities can be somehow
computed, what guarantees do we have the computed probabilities are such that checking differen-
tial privacy can be reduced to a decidable fragment of real arithmetic with exponentiation. We will
show that (see Theorem 13) that for many programs, the former can be achieved by considering the
program as a finite state DTMC even when the randomized choices involve infinite support random
variables. Furthermore, for this class of programs, the probabilities computed are in a form that
allows us to appeal to the decidable fragment of real arithmetic with exponentiation.
Remark. Notice that if one can compute expressions for the probability producing certain outputs
on a given input, we could use the above ideas to also check (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy, instead of
just ǫ-differential privacy. The only change would be to account for δ in our constraints, and to
consider all possible subsets of outputs, instead of just individual output values. Thus, the methods
proposed here go beyond the scope of most automated approaches, which are restricted to vanilla
ǫ-differential privacy.
4 Preliminaries
In this section, we begin by formally defining the computational problem of differential privacy
verification that we consider in this paper. Next, as outlined in Section 3, our approach to deciding
the differential privacy verification problem in special cases, relies on constructing symbolic expres-
sions for the probability of producing a certain output on a given input, and then checking if a
constructed first order sentence holds on the reals. Therefore, we conclude this section by recalling
a decidable fragment of the first order theory of reals with exponentials, that plays an important
role in our decision procedures.
4.1 The Computational Problem
As illustrated by the examples in Section 3, a differential privacy mechanism is typically modeled
as a randomized program Pǫ parametrized by a value ǫ. Having a parameterized program Pǫ
captures the fact that program’s behavior depends on the privacy budget ǫ, with the intention of
guaranteeing that Pǫ is (f(ǫ), g(ǫ))-differentially private, where f and g are some functions of ǫ.
The parameter ǫ is assumed to belong to some interval I ⊆ R>0; usually, we take ǫ to just belong
to the interval (0,∞). The program Pǫ will be assumed to terminate with probability 1 for every
value of ǫ (in the appropriate interval).
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Recall that differential privacy mechanisms are (randomized) programs that take inputs from a
set U and produce outputs over a set V. In this paper, we will assume that both U and V are finite
sets that can be effectively enumerated. Despite our restriction to finite input and output sets, as
we will see in Section 6.1, the computational problem checking differential privacy is challenging. At
the same time, the decidable subclass we identify (Section 6.2), is rich enough to model most known
differential privacy mechanisms even though they have finite input and output sets. Extending our
decidability results to subclasses of programs that have infinite input and output sets, is a non-
trivial open problem at this time.
The computational problems we consider in this paper are as follows. Since our programs take
inputs from a finite set U , we assume that the adjacency relation Φ ⊆ U × U is given to us as an
explicit list of pairs. In general, when discussing (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy of some mechanism, the
additive parameter δ needs to be a function of ǫ. To define the computational problem of checking
differential privacy, the function δ : R>0 → [0, 1] must be given as input. We, therefore, assume
that this function δ has some finite representation; if δ is the constant t (which is often the case),
then we represent δ simply by the number t. There are two computational problems we consider
in this paper.
Fixed Parameter Differential Privacy Given a program Pǫ over inputs U and outputs V, ad-
jacency relation Φ ⊆ U × U , and rational numbers ǫ0, δ0, t ∈ Q, determine if Pǫ0 is (tǫ0, δ0)-
differentially private with respect to Φ.
Differential Privacy Given a program Pǫ over inputs U and outputs V, interval I ⊆ R
>0, δ :
R>0 → [0, 1], an adjacency relation Φ ⊆ U ×U , and a rational number t ∈ Q, determine if Pǫ
is (tǫ, δ(ǫ))-differentially private with respect to Φ for every ǫ ∈ I.
Observe that the Fixed Parameter Differential Privacy problem can be trivially reduced to the
Differential Privacy problem. Thus, an algorithm for checking Differential Privacy can be used
to solve Fixed Parameter Differential Privacy. Unfortunately, the Fixed Parameter Differential
Privacy problem is extremely challenging — we will show that it is undecidable (Section 6.1), and
therefore, so is the Differential Privacy problem. We will identify a class of programs (Section 6.2)
for which the Differential Privacy problem (and therefore the Fixed Parameter Differential Privacy
problem) is decidable. When the differential privacy does not hold, we would like to output a
counterexample.
Definition 2. A counterexample of (ǫ, δ) differential privacy for Pǫ, with respect to an adjacency
relation Φ, a function δ : R>0 → [0, 1] and a value t ∈ Q, is a quadruple (u, u′, S, ǫ0) such that
(u, u′) ∈ Φ, S ⊆ V and ǫ0 > 0 and
Prob(Pǫ0(u) ∈ S) > e
tǫ0 Prob(P (u′) ∈ S) + δ(ǫ0)
When δ is the constant function 0, then S is {v} for some v ∈ V.
4.2 Reals with exponentials
As outlined in the examples in Section 3, our approach towards deciding differential privacy will
rely on reducing the question to checking the truth of a first order sentence for the reals. Because of
the definition of differential privacy, the constructed first order sentence will involve exponentials.
It is a long standing open problem whether there is a decision procedure for the first order theory
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of reals with exponentials. However, some fragments of this theory are known to be decidable. In
particular, there is a fragment identified by McCallum and Weispfenning [25], that we will exploit
in our results.
We will consider first order formulas over a restricted signature and vocabulary. We will denote
this collection of formulas as the language Lexp. Formulas in Lexp are built using variables {ǫ} ∪
{xi | i ∈ N}, constant symbols 0, 1, unary relation symbol e
(·) applied only to the variable ǫ, binary
function symbols +,−,×, and binary relation symbols =, <. The terms in the language are integral
polynomials with rational coefficients over the variables {ǫ} ∪ {xi | i ∈ N} ∪ {e
ǫ}. Atomic formulas
in the language are of the form t = 0 or t < 0 or 0 < t, where t is a term. Quantifier free formulas
are Boolean combinations of atomic formulas. Sentences in Lexp are formulas of the form
QǫQ1x1 · · ·Qnxnψ(ǫ, x1, . . . xn)
where ψ is a quantifier free formula, and Q, Qis are quantifiers. In other words, sentences are
formulas in prenex form, where all variables are quantified, and the outermost quantifier is for the
special variable ǫ.
The theory Thexp is the collection of all sentences in Lexp that are true in the structure
〈R, 0, 1, e(·), +,−,×,=, <〉, where the interpretation for 0, 1,+,−,× is the standard one on re-
als, and e is Euler’s constant; notice that this is an extension of the first order theory of reals. The
crucial property about this theory is that it is decidable.
Theorem 3 (McCallum-Weispfenning [25]). Thexp is decidable.
Finally, our tractable restrictions (and our proofs of decidability) will often the notion of func-
tions definable in Thexp; we therefore, conclude this section with its formal definition.
Definition 4. A function f : R→ R is said to be definable in Thexp, if there is a formula ϕf (ǫ, x)
in Lexp with two free variables (ǫ and x) such that
f(a) = b iff 〈R, 0, 1, e(·),+,−,×,=, <〉 |= ϕf (ǫ, x)[ǫ 7→ a, x 7→ b]
5 Programs with finite valued variables
In this section, we consider randomized algorithms written in a simple while language. The main
restriction for programs in this section, is that all variables only take values in a finite set, i.e.,
there are no real and integer valued variables. Restricting to finite valued variables ensures that the
state space of these programs is finite, and this often ensures that verification is decidable. That
is indeed the case here as well — we will prove the Differential Privacy (and hence also the Fixed
Parameter Differential Privacy) problem to be decidable. However, the proof is not immediate.
There are a couple of challenges that need to be addressed. Focussing on such programs helps
demonstrate the broad principles behind the proof our main theorem (Theorem 15 in Section 6.2)
in a simpler setting. For simplicity of presentation, we will assume that I, the set of admissible ǫ
values, is (0,∞). It is easy to modify the proofs for any interval I with rational end-points.
We begin by syntactically identifying the class of programs we will consider in this section. We
will then sketch its semantics as a (parametrized) discrete time Markov chain, and use that to prove
the decidability of the Differential Privacy problem.
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Expressions (b ∈ B, x ∈ X , d ∈ DOM, g ∈ FBool, f ∈ FDOM):
B ::= true | false | b | not(B) |B and B |B or B | g(E˜)
E ::= d | x | f(E˜)
Basic Program Statements (a ∈ Q>0, ∼∈ {<,>,=,≤,≥}, F is a scoring function and choose
is a user-defined distribution):
s ::= x← E | b← B | x← Exp(aǫ, F (x˜), E) | x← choose(aǫ, E˜)|
ifB thenP elseP end |WhileB doP end | exit
Program Statements (ℓ ∈ Labels)
P ::= ℓ : s | ℓ : s ; P
Figure 1: BNF grammar for Finite DiPWhile. DOM is a finite discrete domain. FBool, (FDOM resp)
are set of functions that output Boolean values (DOM respectively). B,X are the sets of Boolean
variables, and DOM variables, respectively. Labels is a set of program labels. For a syntactic class
S, S˜ denotes a sequence of elements from S.
5.1 Syntax of programs
Programs in this section are simple probabilistic while programs, whose variables take values from
either Booleans, or a finite set DOM. 2 Probabilistic steps in the language correspond to sampling
from a user defined distribution on finite sets or using the exponential mechanism.
The formal syntax of programs in the language Finite DiPWhile 3 is shown in Figure 1. We
have two types for variables: Bool = {true, false}; and finite domain DOM that we assume (without
loss of generality) to be {−Nmax, . . . 0, 1, . . . Nmax}, a finite subset of integers
4. The set of Boolean
and DOM program variables are denoted by B and X , respectively. The set of Boolean and DOM
expressions is given by the non-terminal B and E, respectively in Figure 1. Boolean expressions (B)
can be built using Boolean variables and constants, standard Boolean operations, and by applying
functions from FBool. FBool is assumed to be a collection of computable functions returning a
Bool. DOM expressions (E) are similarly built from DOM variables, values in DOM, and applying
functions from set of computable functions FDOM.
A program in Finite DiPWhile, is a triple consisting of a set of (private) input variables, a set of
(public) output variables, and a finite sequence of labeled statements (non-terminal P in Figure 1).
The set of possibles inputs/outputs (U/V), is identified with the set of valuations for input/output
variables; a valuation over a set of variables X ′ = {x1, x2, . . . , xm} ⊆ X is a function from X
′ to
2Though it is not necessary to distinguish between Booleans and finite domains, having such a distinction makes
our future technical development easier.
3The most general class of programs we prove decidability for are called DiPWhile— short for Differentially Private
While programs. The programs we consider in this section are restricted version of those programs where all variables
take values in a finite set. Hence the name Finite DiPWhile.
4Our decidability results also hold if DOM is taken to be a finite subset of the rationals.
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DOM. Note that if we represent the set X ′ as a sequence x1, x2, . . . , xm then we can represent a
valuation val over x as a sequence val(x1), val(x2), . . . , val(xm) of elements from DOM.
We assume every statement in our program is uniquely labeled from a set of labels called
Labels. Basic program statements (non-terminal s) can either be assignments, conditionals, while
loops, or exit. Boolean and DOM variables can be assigned values of expressions (of appropriate
type). In addition, DOM variables can be probabilistically assigned values by using the exponential
mechanism (Exp(aǫ, F (x˜), E)) or a user defined distribution (choose(aǫ, E˜)). For the exponential
mechanism, we require that the scoring function F be computable and return a rational value.
Both these restrictions are unlikely to be severe in practice, but are needed to ensure decidability.
In the case of user defined distributions, we demand that the probability with which a value in
DOM is chosen (as function of the privacy budget ǫ), be definable in Thexp. Again this is needed
to ensure decidability. Conditionals and while loops in our language are standard.
5.2 Semantics and Decidability
For a program Pǫ (with privacy budget ǫ), the probability of outputting a value out on an input in
is the probability measure of the set of all executions of the program on input in that lead to an exit
state with out as the valuation of output variables. An execution of the program Pǫ (with privacy
budget ǫ), is a sequence of states z0, z1, . . . , zn. Here the states zi are of the form (ℓ, fBool, fDOM),
where ℓ is the label of the statement of Pǫ to be executed next, and the partial functions fBool
and fDOM assign values to the Bool and DOM variables, respectively. z0 is the initial state with in
as the valuation of variables and for each state zi, the state zi+1 is a state that can be obtained
by executing the statement at zi. Note that zi+1 is uniquely determined if the label of zi is a
non-probabilistic statement (in which case we say that probability of transitioning from zi to zi+1
is 1). In case the label of zi is a probabilistic statement then zi+1 is one of the states that can
occur with probability p(ǫ) (in which case we say that probability of transitioning from zi to zi+1 is
p(ǫ)). The probability measure of the execution z0, z1, . . . , zn is obtained by taking the product of
probabilities of transitioning from zi to zi+1 for i = 0, . . . , n− 1. The probability of outputting out
is the sum of the probability measures of all minimal executions that end in a state corresponding
to an exit statement and having out as the valuation of output variables. We do not give a precise
definition and appeal to the intuition of the reader.
The semantics of Finite DiPWhile programs can alternately be defined in the standard way as
a (probabilistic) transition system. As above, for a program Pǫ (with privacy budget ǫ), the states
will be of the form (ℓ, fBool, fDOM), where ℓ is the label of the statement of Pǫ to be executed
next, and the partial functions fBool and fDOM assign values to the Bool and DOM variables,
respectively. Transitions between states are as expected with assignments, conditional branching,
and loops corresponding to deterministic steps based on the values of the variables in the state, and
probabilistic assignment corresponding to probabilistic steps. The precise definition of the DTMC
semantics is skipped since we will define the semantics for an augmented language that includes real
and integer variables in Section 6.2. Since the probabilistic assignments in Pǫ depend on the privacy
budget, the semantics of such programs results in a discrete time Markov chains (DTMC) whose
transition probabilities are a function of ǫ; we call such transition systems parametrized DTMCs.
Definition 5. A parametrized DTMC is a tuple Dǫ = (Z,∆), where Z is a (countable) set of states,
and ∆ : Z ×Z → (R>0 → [0, 1]) is the probabilistic transition function. For any pair of states z, z′,
∆ returns a function from R>0 to [0, 1], such that for every ǫ > 0,
∑
z′∈Z ∆(z, z
′)(ǫ) = 1. We will
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Input: q1, q2
Output: out1, out2
1 out1 ←
{
q1 with prob. =
eǫ
1+eǫ
¬q1 with prob. =
1
1+eǫ
2 out2 ←
{
q2 with prob. =
eǫ
1+eǫ
¬q2 with prob. =
1
1+eǫ
Algorithm 4: Algorithm 1 spe-
cialized when N = 2
1: a b ∗ ∗
2: a b a ∗ 2: a b ¬a ∗
−: a b a b −: a b a ¬b −: a b ¬a b −: a b ¬a ¬b
p q
p q p q
Figure 2: Partial parametrized DTMC se-
mantics of Algorithm 4. State ℓ : a b c d
means statement to be executed is ℓ, q1 = a,
q2 = b, out1 = c, and out2 = d. The number
p is e
ǫ
1+eǫ and q is
1
1+eǫ .
call ∆(z, z′) as the probability of transitioning from z to z′.
A definable parametrized DTMC is a parametrized DTMC Dǫ = (Z,∆) such that for every pair
of states z, z′ ∈ Z, the function ∆(z, z′) is definable in Thexp.
Based on the intuitive description of the semantics, we can say that the semantics of Finite DiP-
While programs can be defined using a finite, parametrized DTMC. Our restrictions on exponential
mechanism (that scoring functions take rational values) and on user defined distributions, ensure
that the resulting probabilities in these transitions can be defined in Thexp. Hence the resulting
DTMC is also definable.
Theorem 6. For any Finite DiPWhile program Pǫ, its semantics [[Pǫ]] is a finite, definable, param-
eterized DTMC that is computable.
Proof Sketch. Follows from the definition of the semantics, and the restriction that user defined
distributions in Finite DiPWhile programs are definable. Observe that, the distribution defined by
the exponential mechanism is definable.
Example 7. Consider the parametrized DTMC semantics of Algorithm 4 shown in Figure 2.
Algorithm 4 is the Randomized Response algorithm (Algorithm 1) specialized when N = 2. The
states of the DTMC record the label of the program statement to be executed next, and the value
of the 4 program variables — q1, q2, out1, out2. In the figure, states are of the form ℓ : a b c d to
indicate that statement ℓ is to be executed, q1 = a, q2 = b, out1 = c, and out2 = d; we use ∗ to
indicate that a variable has not been assigned a value. Figure 2 only shows the DTMC partially.
The full DTMC will have 4 such copies, one corresponding to each possible value a and b can take
(as ⊤ or ⊥).
A parametrized DTMC associates with each (finite) sequence of states ρ = z0, z1, . . . zm, a
function Prob(ρ) : R>0 → [0, 1] that given an ǫ > 0, returns the probability of the sequence ρ when
the parameter’s value is fixed to ǫ, i.e.,
Prob(ρ)(ǫ) =
m−1∏
i=0
∆(zi, zi+1)(ǫ).
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For a state z0 and a set of states Z
′ ⊆ Z, once again we have a function that given a value ǫ for
the parameter, returns the probability of reaching Z ′ from z0. This can be formally defined as
Prob(z0, Z
′)(ǫ) =
∑
ρ∈z0(Z\Z′)∗Z′
Prob(ρ)(ǫ).
In other words, Prob(z0, Z
′)(ǫ) is the sum of the probability of all sequences starting in z0, ending
in Z ′, such no state except the last is in Z ′. An important observation about finite, definable,
parametrized DTMCs is that Prob(z0, Z
′)(ǫ) is both definable and computable.
Theorem 8. For any finite state, definable, parametrized DTMC Dǫ, any state z0 and set of states
Z ′, the function Prob(z0, Z
′) is definable in Thexp. Moreover, there is an algorithm that computes
the formula defining Prob(z0, Z
′).
The proof of Theorem 8 exploits the connection between reachability probabilities in DTMCs
and linear programming [28, 3]; details are postponed to Appendix A.
Theorem 8 can be exploited to yield a decidability result for differential privacy.
Theorem 9. The Fixed Parameter Differential Privacy and Differential Privacy problems are
decidable for Finite DiPWhile programs Pǫ and definable functions δ. Furthermore, if Pǫ is not (ǫ, δ)
differentially private for some admissible value of ǫ then we can compute a counterexample.
Proof. Let in and out be arbitrary valuations to input and output variables, respectively. Observe
that the function ǫ 7→ Prob(Pǫ(in) = out) is nothing but Prob(z0, Z
′) in [[Pǫ]], where z0 is the initial
state corresponding to valuation in, and Z ′ is the set of all terminating states that have valuation
out for output variables. Since [[Pǫ]] (Theorem 6) and Prob(z0, Z
′) (Theorem 8) are computable, we
can construct a formula ϕin,out(ǫ, xin,out) of Lexp that defines the function ǫ 7→ Prob(Pǫ(in) = out).
Let ϕδ(ǫ, xδ) be the formula defining the function δ. Let t =
p
q where p, q are natural numbers.
Consider the sentence
ψ = ∀ǫ.∀z.[∀xin,out]in∈U ,out∈V .∀xδ.
((ǫ > 0) ∧ (epǫ = zq) ∧ (z > 0) ∧ ϕδ(ǫ, xδ)
∧
in∈U ,out∈V ϕin,out(ǫ, xin,out))
→ (
∧
(in1,in2)∈Φ,O⊆V
∑
out∈O(xin1,out < z
∑
out∈O xin2,out + xδ))
It is easy to see Pǫ is differentially private for all ǫ iff ψ is true over the reals. In the syntax of Lexp,
we cannot take qth roots of e; therefore, we introduce the variable z, which enables us to write the
constraints using only eaǫ, where a ∈ N. Notice that ψ belongs to Lexp if we convert it to prenex
form. Decidability therefore follows from the decidability of Thexp.
If Pǫ is not differentially private, then the sentence ψ does not hold. The decision procedure for
Thexp will in this case return an ǫ that witnesses the non-privacy of Pǫ.
Observe that the proof of Theorem 9 lays out a template for proving decidability — if the
semantics of a class of programs can be defined using finite, definable parametrized DTMCs, then
the Fixed Parameter Differential Privacy and Differential Privacy problems are decidable. We will
follow this approach to generalize these results in Section 6 to include programs with real and
integer values variables as well.
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6 Programs with integer and real random variables
We shall now extend the simple probabilistic programs discussed in Section 5 with integer and real
random variables. The language will allow for additional probabilistic steps in the form of sampling
from Laplace and discrete Laplace distributions. The BNF of the programs that we consider is given
in Figure 3 and is explained below. We will denote the class of programs as Simple. The problem of
checking differential privacy for Simple will turn out to be undecidable, but we will identify a strict
subset of Simple for which the problem of checking differential privacy will turn out to decidable.
In addition to the Boolean and DOM variables, we also have variables that can take values in R,
the set of reals, and Z, the set of integers. The set of integer/real program variables will be denoted
by Z/R respectively. The set of integer/real expressions is given by the non-terminal Z/R in
Figure 3. Integer expressions (Z) are built using multiplication and addition with integer constants
and DOM expressions, and additions with other integer expressions. Finally, real expressions (R)
are built using multiplication and addition with rational constants and DOM expressions, and
additions with other real-valued expressions.
The new basic program statements in Simple are assignments to integer/real variables and as-
signments to Boolean variables that arise as a comparison involving integer and real variables.
Statements other than assignments are self-explanatory. The syntax of assignments is designed to
follow a strict discipline. Real and integer variables can either be assigned the value of real/integer
expression or samples drawn using the Laplace or discrete Laplace mechanism. We will also al-
low comparison amongst real and integer expressions of the same sort as assignments to Boolean
variables. As in the case of simple probabilistic programs, we assume that each basic program
statement in a statement is labeled with a label from Labels. A program in our language is specified
by a triple consisting of a set of (private) input variables, a set of (public) output variables and a
program statement.
We do not allow comparison between real and integer expressions. This will be needed in order
to obtain decidability for the restricted fragment of Simple. Further, we will assume that in any
execution, if a variable appears on the right side of an assignment statement, then it should have
been assigned a value before.
Executions and probability measures. Fix ǫ > 0. The probability of outputting a value out
on an input in is the probability measure of the set of all executions of the program Pǫ on input in
that lead to an exit state with out as the valuation of output variables. A execution of the program
Pǫ (with privacy budget ǫ), is a sequence of states z0, z1, . . . , zn. Here the states zi are of the form
(ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fR, fZ), where ℓ is the label of the statement of Pǫ to be executed next, the partial
functions fBool, fDOM, fR and fZ assign values to the Boolean, DOM, real and integer variables
respectively. z0 is the initial state with u as the valuation of input variables and for each state
zi, the state zi+1 is a state that can be obtained by executing the statement at zi. Note that zi+1
is uniquely determined if the label of zi is a non-probabilistic statement. In case the label of zi
is a probabilistic assignment that assigns to a variable x ∈ X/z ∈ Z/r ∈ R respectively then the
only difference in zi+1 from zi is possibly in the valuation to x ∈ X/z ∈ Z/r ∈ R respectively;
the variable can take any value in DOM/Z/R respectively. For each integer k, we can construct a
measure space on the set of all finite executions of length k. The construction of this probability
measure is fairly technical and is given in Appendix B. Henceforth, we refer to the constructed
probability measures as natural semantics of Pǫ.
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Expressions (b ∈ B, x ∈ X , z ∈ Z, r ∈ R, d ∈ DOM, i ∈ Z, q ∈ Q, g ∈ FBool, f ∈ FDOM):
B ::= true | false | b | not(B) |B and B |B or B | g(E˜)
E ::= d | x | f(E˜)
Z ::= z | iZ | EZ | Z + Z | Z + i | Z +E
R ::= r | qR |ER | R+R |R+ q |R+ E
Basic Program Statements (a ∈ Q>0, ∼∈ {<,>,=,≤,≥}, F is a scoring function and choose
is a user-defined distribution):
s ::= x← E | z← Z | r← R | b← B | b← Z1 ∼ Z2|
b← Z ∼ E | b← R1 ∼ R2 | b← R ∼ E|
r← Lap(aǫ,E) | z← DLap(aǫ,E)|
x← Exp(aǫ, F (x˜), E) | x← choose(aǫ, E˜)|
ifB thenP elseP end |WhileB doP end | exit
Program Statements (ℓ ∈ Labels)
P ::= ℓ : s | ℓ : s ; P
Figure 3: BNF grammar for Simple. DOM is a finite discrete domain. FBool, (FDOM resp) are set
of functions that output Boolean values (DOM respectively). B,X ,Z,R are the sets of Boolean
variables, DOM variables, integer random variables and real random variables. Labels is a set of
program labels. For a syntactic class S, S˜ denotes a sequence of elements from S. DiPWhile is the
subclass of programs in which the assignments to real and integer variables do not occur with the
scope of a while statement.
Intuitively, the probable measure is constructed by first defining a σ-algebra over executions
of length k. The σ-algebra is taken to be the σ-algebra generated by special sets of executions
of length k, which we call discrete executions. Discrete executions are defined as follows. For
an execution ρ = (z0, z1, . . . , zn, let the discretization of ρ, denoted disc(ρ), be the sequence
disc(z0), disc(z1), . . . , (zn) where disc((ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fR, fZ)) is defined to be (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fZ).
Intuitively, a discrete execution is the set of all executions ρ which have the same discretization.
Next we define the probability measure of a discrete distribution, which is taken to be the product
of the probabilities of “discrete” transitions that arise because of user-defined distributions, expo-
nential mechanism and sampling from discrete Laplacian distributions and the probability that the
values returned by sampling the continuous Laplacian distributions are consistent with the discrete
execution. For a program Pǫ (with privacy budget ǫ), the probability of outputting a value out on
an input in is then taken to be the sum of probability measure of all minimal discrete executions of
the program on input in that lead to an exit state with out as the valuation of output variables. We
let Probnatural(Pǫ(in) = out) denote the probability. For the rest of the paper, we will assume that
our programs terminate with probability 1, that is, the sum of probability measure of all minimal
discrete executions of the program on input in that lead to an exit state is 1.
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6.1 Undecidability
The problem of checking differential privacy for Simple programs is undecidable.
Theorem 10. The Fixed Parameter Differential Privacy problem and the Differential Privacy
problem for programs Pǫ in Simple is undecidable.
The proof of Theorem 10 is established by reducing the non-halting problem for deterministic 2-
counter Minsky machines (which is known to be undecidable) to the Fixed Parameter Differential
Privacy problem. More precisely, we show that given a 2-counter Minsky machine M (with no
input), there is a program PMǫ ∈ Simple such that
• PMǫ has only one Boolean input bin and one Boolean output bout;
• PMǫ terminates with probability 1 for all ǫ ∈ R
>0;
• PMǫ is (ǫ, 0)-differentially private with respect to the adjacency relation Φ = {(true, false),
(false, true)} if and only if M does not halt.
This construction shows that Differential Privacy is undecidable. Undecidability of Fixed Parameter
Differential Privacy is obtained by taking ǫ to be any constant rational number, say 12 . The formal
details of the reduction and the construction of program PMǫ is postponed to Appendix C in the
interests of space.
6.2 DiPWhile: A decidable class of programs
We now discuss a restricted class of programs, for which we can establish decidability of checking
differential privacy. The class of programs that we consider are exactly those programs that satisfy
the following restriction:
Bounded Assignments We do not allow assignments to real and integer variables within the
scope of a while loop. This ensures that assignments to such variables happen only a bounded
number of times during an execution. Therefore, without loss of generality, we will assume
that real and integer variables are assigned at most once.
For the rest of the paper, we shall refer to this restricted class as DiPWhile. The DiPWhile language
is surprisingly expressive — many known randomized algorithms for differential privacy can be
encoded. We give examples of such encodings in DiPWhile. We omit labels of program statements
unless they are needed.
Example 11. Algorithm 5 shows how SV T can be encoded in our language with T = 0,∆ =
1, N = 2, c = 1. In the example we are modeling ⊥ by 0 and ⊤ by 1. Though for-loops are not part
of our program syntax, they can modeled as while loops, or if bounded (as in this case), they can
be unrolled.
Example 12. Given ǫ > 0 and offset, let Lap+(ǫ, offset) be the continuous distribution whose
probability density function (p.d.f.) is given by
fǫ,µ(x) =
{
ǫ e−ǫ(x−offset) if x ≥ offset
0 otherwise
.
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Input: q1, q2
Output: out1, out2
1 T ← 0;
2 out1 ← 0;
3 out2 ← 0;
4 rT ← Lap(
ǫ
2 , T );
5 r1 ← Lap(
ǫ
4 , q1);
6 b← r1 ≥ rT ;
7 if b then
8 out1 ← 1
else
9 r2 ← Lap(
ǫ
4 , q2);
10 b← r2 ≥ rT ;
11 if b then
12 out2 ← 1
end
end
13 exit
Algorithm 5: SVT for 1-
sensitive queries with N = 2,c =
1 and T = 0. The numbers at
the beginning of a line indicate
the label of the statement.
...
5: q1 : a, q2 : b, T : 0,
out1 : 0, out2 : 0
rT : (
1
2
, 0)
∅
6: q1 : a, q2 : b, T : 0,
out1 : 0, out2 : 0
rT : (
1
2
, 0) r1 : (
1
4
, a)
∅
7: q1 : a, q2 : b, T : 0,
out1 : 0, out2 : 0, b : ⊤
rT : (
1
2
, 0) r1 : (
1
4
, a)
r1 ≥ rT
7: q1 : a, q2 : b, T : 0,
out1 : 0, out2 : 0, b : ⊥
rT : (
1
2
, 0) r1 : (
1
4
, a)
r1 < rT
...
...
1
p q
Figure 4: Partial DTMC semantics of Algorithm 5 showing
the steps when lines 5 and 6 are executed. q1 and q2 are
assumed to have values a and b, respectively. Values of only
assigned program variables is shown. Third line in state
shows parameters for the real values that were sampled.
Last line shows the accumulated set of Boolean conditions
that hold on the path.
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Observe that the one-sided Laplacian distribution Lap+(ǫ, 0) is the standard exponential distribu-
tion. Our language is expressive enough to encode one-sided Laplacians as follows. Consider the
sequence of statements:
X ← Lap(ǫ, 0);
b← X ≤ 0;
if b thenY ← X elseY ← (−1)X end;
Z ← Y + offset
The effect of the sequence of statements is that Z has the one-sided Laplacian distribution Lap+(ǫ, offset).
Other examples that can be encoded in our language (and for which the decision procedure
applies) include randomized response, the multiplicative weights and iterative database construc-
tion [22, 21], the private smart sum algorithm [11], and private vertex cover [20].
We will now prove the main result of this paper — the decidability of the Fixed Parameter
Differential Privacy and Differential Privacy problems for DiPWhile programs. Our proof rests on
two observations. First, the semantics of DiPWhile programs can also be defined as finite state
discrete time Markov chains (DTMC). This observation is surprising because DiPWhile programs
have real and integer values variables, and so a na¨ıve definition of semantics will have infinitely
many states. The key insight in establishing this observation is that an equivalent semantics of
DiPWhile programs can be defined without explicitly tracking the values of real and integer-valued
variables. Second, all the transition probabilities arising in our semantics are definable in Thexp.
These two observations allow us to to establish decidability of checking differential privacy of
DiPWhile programs.
DTMC Semantics
The DTMC semantics of a DiPWhile program Pǫ, which we explain below, shall be denoted as [[Pǫ]].
Our key insight in defining the semantics of a program as a finite state, parametrized DTMC, is
that we do not need to track the actual values of real and integer valued variables. Our state is
going to be a tuple of the form (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fint, freal, C) where ℓ is the label of the statement
of Pǫ to be executed next. The functions fBool and fDOM assign values to the Bool and DOM
variables, respectively; this is just like in the na¨ıve semantics. Let us now look at freal. Intuitively,
freal is supposed to be the “valuation” for the real variables. But instead of mapping each variable
to a value in R, we will instead map it to a finite set. To understand this mapping, let us recall
that in DiPWhile a real variable is assigned only once in a program. Further, such an assignment
either assigns the value of a linear expression over program variables, or samples using a Laplace
mechanism. Therefore, freal will map a variable to either the linear expression it is assigned,
or the expressions defining the parameters of the Laplace mechanism used in sampling. Notice
that the range of freal is now a finite set. Similarly, fint maps each integer variable to either the
linear expression it is assigned or the parameters of the discrete Laplace mechanism. The last
state component C is the set of Boolean conditions on real and integer variables that hold along
the path thus far; this will become clearer when we describe the transitions. Since the Boolean
conditions must be Boolean expressions in the program or their negation, C is also a finite set.
These observations show that we will have finitely many states.
We now sketch how the state is updated in [[Pǫ]]. Updates to DOM variables will be as expected
— it will be a probabilistic transition if the assignment samples using an exponential mechanism or a
user defined distribution, and it will be a deterministic step updating fDOM otherwise. Assignments
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to real variables are always deterministic steps that change the function freal. Thus, even if the
step samples using the Laplace mechanism, in the semantics it will be modeled as a deterministic
step where freal is updated by storing the parameters of the distribution. Similarly all integer
assignments are deterministic steps as well. Steps where a Boolean variable is assigned a Boolean
expressions will be modeled as expected — we update the valuation fBool to reflect the assignment.
The interesting case is, b ← R1 ∼ R2, when a boolean variable gets assigned the result of the
comparison of two real expressions; the case of comparing two integer expressions is similar. In
this case, we will transition to a state where R1 ∼ R2 is added to C with probability equal to
the probability that (R1 ∼ R2) holds conditioned on the fact that C holds; if the probability of C
holding is 0 then the DTMC will transition to a special reject state. With the remaining probability
we will transition to the state where ¬(R1 ∼ R2) is added to C. Thus, Boolean assignments will
be modeled by probabilistic transitions. Finally, branches and while loop conditions are modeled
as deterministic steps, with choice of the next statement being determined by the value of the
Boolean variable (of the condition) in fBool. Let ProbDTMC(Pǫ(in) = out) denote the probability
that Pǫ outputs value out on the input in under the DTMC semantics. This is just the probability
of reaching an exit state with out as valuation of output variables from the initial state with in as
the valuation of input variables. We can show that this probability is the same as the probability
Probnatural(Pǫ(in) = out) obtained by the natural semantics discussed above. The informal ideas
outlined here can be fleshed out to give a precise mathematical definition. This is presented in
Appendix D.
It is worth noting how key syntactic restrictions in DiPWhile programs play a role in defining its
semantics. The first restriction is that integer and real variables are not assigned in the scope of a
while loop. This is critical to ensure that the DTMC [[Pǫ]] is finite state. Since we track distribution
parameters and linear expressions for such variables, this restriction ensures that we only remember
a bounded number of these. Second, DiPWhile disallows comparison between real and integer
expressions in its syntax. Recall that such comparison steps result in a probabilistic transition,
where we compute the probability of the comparison holding conditioned on the properties in C
holding. It is unclear if a closed form expression for these probabilities can be computed when we
also allow for comparison between integer and real random variables. Hence they are disallowed.
Probabilistic transitions in our semantics arise due to two reasons. First are assignments to
DOM variables that sample according to either the exponential or a user defined distribution. As
already observed in Section 5 the resulting probabilities are definable in Thexp. The second is due to
comparisons between real and integer expressions. We can prove that in this case also, the resulting
probabilities are definable in Thexp; this proof is non-trivial and is deferred to Appendix E. All these
observations together give us the following theorem.
Theorem 13. For any DiPWhile program Pǫ, [[Pǫ]] is a finite, definable, parametrized DTMC that
is computable.
Example 14. The parametrized DTMC semantics of Algorithm 5 is partially shown in Figure 4.
We show only the transitions corresponding to executing lines 5 and 6 of the algorithm, when
q1 = a and q2 = b initially; here a, b ∈ {⊥,⊤}. The multiple lines in a given state give the different
components of the state. The first two lines give the assignment to Bool and DOM variables, the
third line gives values to the integer/real variables, and the last line are the Boolean conditions
that hold along a path. Notice that values to real variables are not explicit values, but rather the
parameters used when they were sampled. Finally, observe that probabilistic branching takes place
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when line 6 is executed, where the value of b is taken to be the result of comparing r1 and rT .
The numbers p and q correspond to the probability that the conditions in a branch hold, given the
parameters used to sample the real variables.
We have the main result of our paper which follows from Theorems 13 and 8 along the same
lines as in the proof of Theorem 9.
Theorem 15. The Fixed Parameter Differential Privacy and Differential Privacy problems are
decidable for DiPWhile programs Pǫ and definable functions δ. Furthermore, if Pǫ is not (ǫ, δ)
differentially private for some admissible value of ǫ then we can compute a counterexample.
We conclude the section by observing that our methods can be employed to analyze larger class
of programs (than just those in DiPWhile).
Finite discretization of infinite output spaces Our decision procedure checks differential
privacy of programs whose output space is finite. In many examples, the program outputs are
reals or unbounded integers (and combinations thereof). Nevertheless, we argue that our decision
procedure can still be used in the verification of differential privacy. Specifically, our method can
be used as an under-approximation technique for checking differential privacy of P. Our approach
in such cases is to discretize the output space into finitely many intervals.
We illustrate this for the special case when a program P outputs the value of one real random
variable, say r. Now, suppose that we modify P to output a finite discretized version of r as follows.
Let seq = a0 < a1 < . . . an be a sequence of rationals and let
Discseq(x) =


a0 x ≤ a0
a1 a0 < x ≤ a1
...
an−1 an−2 < x ≤ an−1
an otherwise
.
Consider the program PDisc,seq that instead of outputting r, outputs Discseq(r). It is easy to see that if
P is differentially private then so must be PDisc,seq. Therefore, if PDisc,seq is not differentially private
then we can conclude that P is not differentially private. Thus, if our decision procedure finds a
counterexample for PDisc,seq, then it also has proved that P is not differentially private. Our method
can, therefore, be used as an under-approximation technique for checking differential privacy of P .
In fact, it is a complete under-approximation method in the sense that P is differentially private
iff for each possible seq, PDisc,seq is differentially private.
A general semantic class of programs We conclude by showing that our methods implies
decidability of checking differential privacy for a large semantic class of programs (which include
DiPWhile.) A sufficient condition to ensure the decidability of checking differential privacy is to
consider programs with the property that for each input, the probability distribution on the outputs
is definable in Thexp. This identifies the semantic class of programs:
Definition 16. A parametrized program Pǫ with inputs U and outputs V is said to identify a
definable distribution on V if for each in ∈ U and out ∈ V the function ǫ 7→ Prob(Pǫ(in) = out) is
definable in Thexp.
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A parametrized program Pǫ with inputs U and outputs V is said to effectively identify a definable
distribution on V if there is an algorithm A such that for each in ∈ U and out ∈ V, A outputs a
formula ϕin,out(ǫ, x) in Lexp that defines the function ǫ 7→ Prob(Pǫ(in) = out).
We can conclude by a proof similar to the proof of Theorem 9 and Theorem 15.
Theorem 17. The Fixed Parameter Differential Privacy and Differential Privacy problems are
decidable for programs Pǫ that effectively identify a definable distribution and definable functions
δ (in the case of the Differential Privacy problem). Furthermore, if Pǫ is not (ǫ, δ) differentially
private for some admissible value of ǫ then we can compute a counterexample.
7 Experimental evaluation
We implemented a simplified version of the algorithm, presented earlier, for proving/disproving
differential privacy of DiPWhile programs. Our tool DiPC [2] handles loop-free programs, i.e., acyclic
programs. Programs with bounded loops (with constant bounds) can be handled by unrolling loops.
The tool takes in an input program Pǫ parametrized by ǫ, and either proves Pǫ to be differentially
private for all ǫ or returns a counterexample. The tool can also be used to check differential privacy
for a given, fixed ǫ, or to check for kǫ-differential privacy for some constant k. The design of the
tool will be discussed in detail in Section 7.2.
7.1 Examples
We used various examples to measure the effectiveness of our tool. These include SVT [24, 18],
Noisy Maximum [15], Noisy Histogram [15] and Randomized Response [17]. Pseudocodes for all
variants of these examples that we tried are given in Appendix F for completeness. Though the
pseudo-codes don’t strictly adhere to the syntax of DiPWhile programs, they can easily be rewritten
to fit the syntax.
Sparse Vector Technique (SVT) We looked at six different variants of the Sparse Vector
Technique (SVT). Algorithms addressed as SVT1-6, are Algorithms 1-6 in [24], respectively. In
these programs, the array q represents the input queries. The array out represents the output
array, ⊥ represents False and ⊤ represents True. In all our experiments, we set the threshold
T = 0. SVT1 was previously introduced in this paper as Algorithm 3 on Page 3. The adjacency
relation Φ we used is given by (q1, q2) ∈ Φ if and only if |q1[i]− q2[i]| ≤ 1 for all i. While SVT1 and
SVT2 are differentially private, the other four variants are not. We will present counterexamples
for all four of these variants in Section 7.3.
Noisy Maximum Noisy maximum algorithms are a differentially private way to compute differ-
ent statistical measures for a given set of queries. Algorithms addressed as NMax1-4 are Algorithms
5-8, respectively, in [15]. Algorithms NMax1 and NMax2 are mechanisms to compute the index of
the query with maximum value after adding a Laplacian (or exponential) noise. Inputs Q1 and Q2
are considered adjacent iff |Q1[i]−Q2[i]| ≤ 1 for all i. Under this relation, Algorithms NMax1 and
NMax2 are both ǫ-differentially private. Algorithms NMax3 and NMax4 are variants to print the
maximum value instead of the index. These variants are shown to be not differentially private in
Section 7.3.
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Histogram Algorithms Histogram algorithms also target computing statistical measures on
queries in a differentially private manner. Algorithms referred to as Hist1-2 here are Algorithms
9-10 in [15]. Algorithm Hist1 and Hist2 are variants of noisy maximum, where we return the
histogram, instead of the maximum. Under the above adjacency relation where Q1 and Q2 are
adjacent if |Q1[i]−Q2[i]| ≤ 1 for all i, both these variants are not ǫ-differentially private. However,
if we consider an alternative definition for the adjacency relation, where Q1 and Q2 are adjacent iff∑
i
(
|Q1[i]−Q2[i]|
)
≤ 1, then Hist1 is ǫ-differentially private but Hist2 still is not. All experiments
listed in Section 7.3 for Algorithms NMax1 and NMax2 were run using the second adjacency
relation.
Randomized Response All the previous algorithms use the Laplace mechanism. Randomized
Response [17], on the other hand, uses discrete probabilities. In this algorithm, given a set of
Boolean input queries, we flip each input query with a probability of e
ǫ−1
2 and output the resulting
outcome. We also consider a non-private version where the input query is flipped with probability
1−ǫ
2 . These algorithms have already been introduced in Section 3 as Algorithms 1 (called henceforth
as Rand1) and 2 (called henceforth as Rand2) on Page 7.
Sparse Sparse is a variant of SVT that is discussed in [18]. Our reason for considering this
example is to demonstrate our tool’s ability to handle (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy (see Section 7.4).
Pseudocode for this algorithm is provided in Section 7.4.
7.2 Tool Design
Given a program and an adjacency relation, DiPC outputs true if the program is differentially pri-
vate and outputs a counterexample if it is not. The tool works in two phases. In the first phase,
the tool parses the program, computes symbolic expressions that capture the output distribution,
and identify inequalities that must hold for differential privacy. The symbolic expressions for the
probability computation, and the logical constraints that must hold, are written in a Wolfram
Mathematica R©script. In the second phase, Mathematica is run to perform the symbolic computa-
tions and check the results.
The computation of the output distribution proceeds in a manner consistent with the decision
procedure outlined in the proof of Theorem 15. Recall that the parametrized DTMC semantics,
the state tracks constraints that must hold between different real variables. These constraints can
be tracked by maintaining a partial order between the variables. One of the engineering challenges
we experienced was in the computation of the probability of the partial order holding, given the
parameters used during sampling. The “Probability[]” command in Mathematica was very slow and
inefficient. Instead we decided to convert the partial order into a set of total orders, and compute
the probability of each total order through integration.
For example, to compute the probability of x1 < x2 < x3... < xn, where variable xi has
p.d.f Di, we would first compute the probability P (xn > x) =
∫∞
x Dn(y)dy. We then compute
the probabilities P (xn > xn−1 > x) =
∫∞
x P (xn > y)Dn−1(y)dy, P (xn > xn−1 > xn−2 > x) =∫∞
x P (xn > xn−1 > y)Dn−2(y)dy and so on. Once we have computed P (xn > xn−1 > ... > x1 > x),
we can compute P (xn > xn−1 > ... > x1) = Limx→−∞P (xn > xn−1 > ... > x1 > x). Additionally,
we try to optimize the above process by splitting the partial order into connected components and
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Algorithm
Runtime
(T1/T2)
ǫ-Diff.
Pri-
vate
SVT1 0s/825s ✓
SVT2 0s/768s ✓
SVT3 0s/3816s ✓
SVT4 0s/269s ✗
SVT5 0s/2s ✗
SVT6 0s/661s ✗
NMax1 0s/197s ✓
NMax2 0s/59s ✓
NMax3 0s/310s ✗
NMax4 1s/58s ✗
Hist1 0s/1450s ✓
Hist2 0s/55s ✗
Rand1 0s/0s ✗
Rand2 0s/0s ✗
Table 1: Runtime for 3 queries for each
algorithm searching over adjacency pairs
and all ǫ > 0, with parameters being
[c=1, ∆=1, DOM = {−1, 0, 1}, seq = (−1 <
0 < 1)]. For SVT, we also have T=0.
—Q— c ǫ
Runtime (T1/T2)
Fixed ǫ General
1 1 1.0 0s/7s 0s/16s
1 1 0.5 0s/8s 0s/16s
2 1 1.0 0s/43s 0s/113s
2 1 0.5 0s/46s 0s/113s
2 2 1.0 0s/95s 0s/155s
2 2 0.5 0s/113s 0s/155s
3 1 1.0 0s/307s 0s/825s
3 1 0.5 0s/265s 0s/825s
3 2 1.0 0s/541s 0s/1202s
3 2 0.5 0s/572s 0s/1202s
4 1 1.0 0s/1772s 0s/4727s
4 1 0.5 0s/1832s 0s/4727s
4 2 1.0 1s/2904s 0s/6715s
4 2 0.5 1s/3295s 0s/6715s
Table 2: Runtimes of SVT1 over different
query length and counts, searching over all ad-
jacency pairs and fixed ǫ, with parameters be-
ing [∆=1, T=0, DOM={-1,0,1}].
computed probability for each component. Further, we also deal with constant assignments to real
variables by slightly modifying the integration method.
7.3 Experimental Results
We ran all the experiments on an octa-core Intel R©Core i7-8550U @ 1.8gHz CPU with 8GB memory.
The tool is implemented in C++ and uses Wolfram Mathematica R©. As mentioned in Section 7.2,
the tool works in two phases — in the first phase, a Mathematica script is produced with commands
for all the output probability computations and the subsequent inequality checks and in the second
phase, the generated script is run on Mathematica. In all the following tables, we refer the times
of the Script Generation Phase (i.e. Phase 1) as T1 and that of the Script Validation Phase (i.e.
Phase 2) as T2.
Unless stated otherwise, all the experiments were run with the parameters c = 1, ∆ = 1 and
discretization parameter seq = (−1 < 0 < 1) wherever applicable. The range of input query values
was DOM = {−1, 0, 1} in all the experiments. The running times in all experiments were averaged
over 3 runs of the tool.
Table 1 shows the runtime of our tool for all the listed algorithms with 3 queries. We chose to use
3 queries because counterexamples for most of the programs which were not differentially private
could be found with 3 queries; the only exception being SVT3. Majority of the time is taken for
running the Mathematica code. We also observed that most of the time spent by Mathematica was
in computing the output probability; the time to perform the inequality checks for adjacent inputs
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Algo —Q— Output Input 1 Input 2 ǫ
Runtime
(T1/T2)
SVT3 5
[⊥ ⊥ ⊥ ⊥
0], seq =
(0 < 1)
[-1 -1 -1 -1 -1] [0 0 0 0 0] 27 18s/5042s
SVT4 2 [⊥ ⊤] [-1 0] [0 -1] 27/50 0s/81s
SVT5 2 [⊥ ⊤] [-1 0] [-1 -1] 27 0s/2s
SVT6 3 [⊥ ⊥ ⊤] [-1 -1 0] [0 0 -1] 67/92 0s/661s
NMax3 3
-1, seq =
(−1 < 0 <
1)
[-1 -1 -1] [0 0 0] 27 0s/310s
NMax4 1
0, seq =
(−1 < 0 <
1)
[-1] [0] 27 0s/2s
Hist2 1
[-1], seq =
(−1 < 0 <
1)
[-1] [0] 9/34 0s/3s
Rand2 1 [⊥] [⊥] [⊤] 9/34 0s/0s
Table 3: Smallest Counterexample found for each non-differentially private algorithm, searching
over all adj. pairs and ǫ > 0, with parameters being [c=1, ∆=1, DOM={-1,0,1}]
was relatively smaller. Consequently, programs which do not use real variables are much faster to
run. Results in the table also show that the time taken for disproving Differential Privacy is lower
than the time for proving Differential Privacy on average. This is because the tool terminates on
finding a counterexample. On the other hand, to prove differential privacy the tool has to check all
inequalities.
Table 3 lists the smallest counterexample found for each non differentially private algorithm.
Given a program and an adjacency relation, the tool automatically finds an ǫ, the pair of adjacent
inputs, and the output value that demonstrate the violation of differential privacy. All four columns
in the table were output by the tool. Further, we observe that the counterexamples found were
much smaller, in number of queries, compared to those found in [15]. For example, algorithms
NMax3 and NMax4 counterexamples need just 3 and 1 queries respectively, compared to the 5
queries required in [15]. Similarly, algorithm SVT5 has a counterexample with just 2 queries, as
compared to the 10 queries.
To study the performance of the tool as the number of queries increases, we analyzed SVT1 for
various number of queries. The running times along with the number of queries and the value for
c is shown in Table 4. The table shows that the tool can handle a reasonable number of queries.
In all the experiments so far, the value of ǫ was not fixed. So DiPC had to either prove privacy
for all ǫ or find an ǫ where privacy is violated. Many automated tools are designed only to disprove
differential privacy for a fixed ǫ. We tried the performance of the tool on SVT1 for a fixed ǫ. The
results are reported in Table 2. As can be seen by comparing the numbers in Tables 4 and 2, fixing
ǫ makes the problem easier to handle.
Finally, we wanted to explore the scalability of our tool when we checking differential privacy
for a single pair of adjacent inputs. In Table 5, we have the results when a non differentially private
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—Q— c
Runtime
(T1/T2)
1 1 0s/16s
2 1 0s/113s
2 2 0s/155s
3 1 0s/825s
3 2 0s/1202s
4 1 0s/4727s
4 2 0s/6715s
Table 4: Runtimes of SVT1 over differ-
ent query length and counts, searching
over all adjacency pairs and all ǫ¿0, with
parameters being [∆=1, T=0, DOM={-
1,0,1}]
#Queries
1 Pair
Run-
time
(T1/T2)
General
Run-
time
(T1/T2)
ǫ-Diff.
Private
1 0s/15s 0s/25s ✓
2 0s/40s 0s/192s ✓
3 0s/100s 0s/1562s ✓
4 0s/199s 1s/10515s ✓
5 0s/141s 18s/5042s ✗
Table 5: Runtimes of SVT3 over different query
lengths, searching over a single adj. pair
([00...]∼[11...]) and all ǫ > 0, with parameters be-
ing [c=1, T=0, ∆=1, DOM={-1,0,1}, seq = (0 <
1)]
algorithm, namely SVT3 was run with a single adjacency pair ([00...]∼[11...]), while varying number
of queries. We notice that the running times is significantly lower in this case. Another interesting
observation is that the time taken for 5 queries is lower than the time for 4 queries. This is because
with 5 queries, the tool successfully finds a counterexample and terminates before checking the
remaining inequalities.
7.4 (ǫ, δ)-Differential Privacy
DiPC can also verify (ǫ, δ)-differential privacy. Algorithm 6 (taken from [18]), referred to henceforth
as Sparse, was used to evaluate DiPC’s performance in this case. This algorithm has been manually
proven to be ( ǫ2 , δsvt)-differentially private for any number of queries in [18] by using advanced
composition theorems.
When c = 1 and δsvt = e
− 1
32 , this algorithm is identical to Algorithm SVT1, where parameters
c and ∆ are replaced by parameter σ. This algorithm is, therefore, ǫ-differentially private. Fur-
ther, our tool proves that the algorithm is not ǫ2 -differentially private. Thanks to the advanced
composition theorem, we can show that the resulting algorithm is ( ǫ2 , e
− 1
32 )-differentially private.
The tool also shows that for all ǫ > 0, the algorithm is ( ǫ2 , e
−2)-differentially private for c = 1 for
queries of length 3 with DOM = {0, 1} and T = 0 (observe that e−
1
32 > e−2). Additionally, we get
a counterexample for ( ǫ2 , e
−2.125)-differential privacy.
When c = 2 and δsvt = e
− 1
64 , Sparse differs from SVT1 since in this case we also need to choose
rT again after outputting a ⊤. The resulting program is (
ǫ
2 , e
−1/64)-differentially private thanks
to the advanced composition theorem. DiPC confirms that for queries of length 3, the resulting
program is infact ( ǫ2 , e
−2)-differentially private with DOM = {0, 1} and T = 0. Further, DiPC also
demonstrates that the resulting program is not ( ǫ2 , e
−2.5) differentially private.
Here we are able to check the correctness of Sparse automatically, for values of c = 1, 2 and for
the above given values of δsvt and for all ǫ > 0. To the best of our knowledge, our approach is the
first method to automatically check this. These results are summarized in Table 6.
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Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
σ ← ǫ
2
√
32c ln 1
δsvt
rT ← Lap(σ, T )
count← 0
for i← 1 to N do
r← Lap(σ2 , q[i])
b← r ≥ rT
if b then
out[i]← ⊤,
rT ← Lap(σ, T )
count← count+ 1
if count ≥ c then
exit
end
else
out[i]← ⊥
end
end
Algorithm 6: Sparse algo-
rithm
c δsvt δ Runtime (T1/T2) (
ǫ
2 , δ)-Diff. Privacy
1 e−
1
32 0 0s/48s ✗
1 e−
1
32 e−3 0s/142s ✗
1 e−
1
32 e−2.125 0s/146s ✗
1 e−
1
32 e−2 0s/161s ✓
2 e−
1
64 0 0s/72s ✗
2 e−
1
64 e−3 0s/187s ✗
2 e−
1
64 e−2.5 0s/182s ✗
2 e−
1
64 e−2 0s/288s ✓
Table 6: DiPCresult for ( ǫ2 , δ)-Diff. Privacy of SPARSE
(Algorithm 6) with 3 queries, searching over all adj.
pairs and ǫ > 0, with parameters being [T=0, DOM =
{0, 1}]
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8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have considered the problem of automatically checking differential privacy of
various mechanisms. We showed that, in general, this problem is undecidable even for a simple
class of mechanisms. We have presented a language for specifying such mechanisms, and identified
a well defined interesting class of programs presented in this language, and showed that, for this
class of programs, the problem of checking ǫ-differential privacy, for all ǫ > 0, is decidable. Our
proposed decision procedure, for a subclass of programs, has been implemented as a tool, called
DiPC. DiPC has been used to automatically check that some of the well-known algorithms presented
in the literature are ǫ-differentially private, for all values of ǫ > 0. It has also been used to show that
some of the other algorithms are not ǫ-differentially private, and in these cases, our tool generated a
counter example together with a value of ǫ for which differential privacy is violated. An important
benefit of our tool is that it can check bounds that are based on concentration inequalities, in
particular bounds that use advanced composition theorems. Such bounds are out of reach of most
other tools that prove privacy or search for counter examples.
Our current tool only works for the case when we have a fixed number of input and output
variables, and they take values from a finite domain. As part of future research, it will be interesting
to extend this work for (i) the cases when the input and output variables can take values over infinite
domains, such as reals or integers, (ii) a parametrized class of privacy algorithms, that are designed
to work for unbounded number of input and output variables.
In addition, it will be interesting to study the application of our methods for checking accuracy
bounds. Prior work [5, 29] focuses on proving accuracy bounds, but is not able to accommodate
tight bounds based on concentration inequalities. Moreover, we are not aware of prior work that
aims to detect violations of accuracy bounds.
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A Reachability in Parametrized DTMCs
In this section we will prove Theorem 8. Let us first recall how reachability probabilities are
computed in (non-parametrized) finite state DTMCs. Recall that a (non-parametrized) DTMC is
a pair (Q, δ) where Q is a finite set of states, and δ : Q× Q → [0, 1] is such that for every q ∈ Q,∑
q′∈Q δ(q, q
′) = 1. So in a DTMC the transition probabilities are fixed, and are not functions of
a parameter. The probability of reaching a set of states Q′ ⊆ Q from a state q0 is computed by
solving a more general problem, namely, the problem of computing the probability of reaching Q′
from each state q ∈ Q. Let the variable xq denote the probability of reaching Q
′ from state q. One
simple observation is that if q ∈ Q′ then xq = 1. Second, if Q0 denotes the set of all states from
which Q′ is not reachable in the underlying graph (i.e., one where we ignore the probabilities and
just have edges for all transitions that are non-zero), then xq = 0 if q ∈ Q0. Now the set Q0 can be
computed by performing a simple graph search on the underlying graph. For states q 6∈ (Q′ ∪Q0),
we could write xq as xq =
∑
q′∈Q δ(q, q
′)xq′ . This gives us the following system of linear equations.
xq = 1 if q ∈ Q
′
xq = 0 if q ∈ Q0
xq =
∑
q′∈Q δ(q, q
′)xq′ otherwise
The above system of linear equations can be shown to have a unique solution, with the solution
giving the probability of reaching Q′ from each state q.
Now let us consider a parametrized DTMC D = (Z,∆). Let ϕzz′ be a Lexp formula that defines
the function ∆(z, z′). Recall that in the algorithm outlined in the previous paragraph, one crucial
step is to compute the set of states that have probability 0 of reaching the target set. This requires
knowing the underlying graph of the DTMC, i.e., knowing which transitions have probability 0
and which ones have probability > 0. In a parametrized DTMC this is challenging because the
probability of transitions depends on the value of ǫ, and our goal is to compute the reachability
probability as a function of ǫ. We will overcome this challenge by “guessing” the underlying graph.
Let C ⊆ Z×Z. We will construct a formula ϕC that will capture the constraints that reachablity
probabilities need to satisfy under the assumption that the probability of edges in C is 0, and those
outside C is > 0. Based on the assumption that C is exactly the set of 0 probability edges, we can
compute the set ZC0 of states that cannot reach Z
′. The formula ϕC will have variables that will
have the following intuitive interpretations — pzz′ the probability of transitioning from z to z
′; xz
the probability of reaching Z ′ from state z.
ϕC =
∧
(z,z′)∈C(pzz′ = 0) ∧
∧
(z,z′)6∈C(pzz′ > 0) ∧
∧
z∈Z′(xz = 1)
∧
∧
z∈ZC
0
(xz = 0) ∧
∧
z 6∈(Z′∪ZC
0
)(xz =
∑
z′ pzz′xz′).
Notice that ϕC is a formula in Lexp. ϕC can be used to construct the formula we want. To construct
the formula ϕz0Z′ that characterizes the probability of reaching Z
′ from z0, we need to account for
two things. First, we need to ensure that pzz′ is indeed the probability of transitioning from z to z
′.
Second, we need to account for the fact that we don’t know the exact set of edges with probability
0. Based on these observations, we can define ϕz0,Z′ as follows.
ϕz0Z′ = [∃xz]z 6=z0 [∃pzz′ ]z,z′∈Z
∧
z,z′∈Z
ϕzz′(ǫ, pzz′) ∧

 ∨
C⊆Z×Z
ϕC


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In the above definition of ϕz0Z′ all variables except xz0 (and ǫ) are existentially quantified. Notice,
that ϕz0Z′ is in Lexp provided we pull all the quantifiers to get it in prenex form. Given that
ZC0 can be effectively constructed for any set C, the above formula can also be computed for any
parametrized DTMC D.
B Semantics of Simple
In this section we give the semantics of our Simple language. This semantics will be given as a
set of computations and a probability space on the set of computations. We make the follwoing
assumption on the programs. In every computation a reference to a variable is preceded (some
times earlier) by an assignment to the variable, i.e., the variable is defined. Such an assumption
can be guaranteed by a simple syntactic restriction the programs.
Let us fix some basic notation. Partial functions from A to B will be denoted as A →֒ B. The
value of f : A →֒ B on a ∈ A, will be denoted as f(a). Two partial functions f and g will be
equal (denoted f ≃ g) if for every element a, either f and g are both undefined, or f(a) = f(b). If
f : A →֒ B, a ∈ A and b ∈ B, then f [a 7→ b] denotes the partial function that agrees with f on all
elements of A except a; on a, f [a 7→ b](a) = b.
In the rest of this section let us fix a Simple program Pǫ and an ǫ > 0. The only assumption we
make on Pǫ is that every refere in a computation is statement then referenced L will denote the set
of labels appearing in Pǫ. A valuation val for DOM variables is a function that assigns a value in
DOM to variables in X ; we will denote set of all such valuations by VDOM.
In order to define the semantics of Pǫ, we will use an auxiliary function next that given a
label, identifies the label of the statement to be executed next. Observe that for most program
statements, the next statement to be executed is unique. However, for if and While statements, the
next statement depends on the value of a Boolean expression. We will define next(ℓ) to be a set
of pairs of the form (ℓ′, c) with the understanding that ℓ′ is the next label if c holds. Thus, for a
label ℓ, next(ℓ) will either be {(ℓ′, true)} or {(ℓ1, c), (ℓ2,¬c)}. We do not give a precise definition of
next(·), but we will use it when defining the semantics.
States States of [[Pǫ]] will be of the form
(ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fZ, fR).
Informally, ℓ ∈ L is the label of the statement to be executed, fBool, fDOM, fZ, and fR are partial
functions assigning “values” to program variables (of appropriate type). More specifically, we
have fBool : B →֒ {true, false}, fDOM : X →֒ DOM, fZ : Z →֒ Z and fR : R →֒ R . We let S
denote the set of states. For a state s and an expression e which is a Boolean, real or an integer
expression, we let V al(s, e) denote the value obtained by evaluating e in the state s. Note that if e
is a boolean expression, V al(s, e) is either True or False. We also define the value of a comparison
between two expressions as follows. For a comparison expression e1 ∼ e2, V al(s, e1 ∼ e2) = True
if V al(s, e1) ∼ V al(s, e2) holds, otherwise V al(s, e1 ∼ e2) = False.
Initial States Let ℓin be the label of the first statement of Pǫ. Let f
in
Bool, f
in
Z , and f
in
R be partial
functions with an empty domain. An initial state of Pǫ will be of the form (ℓin, f
in
Bool, f
in
DOM, f
in
Z , f
in
R ),
where f inDOM is defined only on the input variables; the values given to these variables by f
in
DOM will
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be the “initial input value”. We fix a unique initial state sinit and give semantics of Pǫ with respect
to this.
Executions We define a execution of Pǫ to be a finite sequence of states of non-zero length, i.e.,
a member of S+. Note all executions may not be valid. If α = (s0, ..., si) is a finite execution and
s′ is a state, then we let last(α) denote the state si and αs
′ denote the finite execution given by
(s0, ..., si, s
′).
Discrete states and discrete executions A discrete state d is tuple of the form (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fZ),
where ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fZ are as defined earlier. A discrete state is similar to a state excepting that
it does not specify the values to real variables. For a discrete state d as given above, and a par-
tial function fR : R →֒ R, we let (d, fR) denote the state (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fZ, fR). Also, for a state
s = (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fZ, fR), we let disc state(s) denote the discrete state (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fZ). Let
Σ be the set of all discrete states and dinit denote the discrete state disc state(sinit). A discrete
execution is a finite sequence of discrete states. For any finite execution α = (s0, ..., sj , ..., si), we
let disc comp(α) denote the discrete execution (disc state(s0), ..., disc state(sj), ..., disc state(si)).
Semantic Objects With each discrete execution u = (u0, ..., ui−1) ∈ Σ
∗, of length i > 0, we
associate the following semantic objects , defined inductively on the length i of u : (i) a set of finite
executions C(u) ⊆ Si; (ii) a real number prob(u) whose value is in [0, 1], which intuitively denotes
the product of probabilities of discrete transitions in u; (iii) a non-negative integer NumInd(u)
which denotes the number of random assignments to real variables, in each execution in C(u),
drawn from samples of independent Laplacian distributions; (iv) a function Param(u) : {j | 1 ≤
j ≤ NumInd(u)} → R × R, where Param(u)(j) (1 ≤ j ≤ NumINd(u)) gives the mean and the
scaling factor of the Laplacian distribution used in the jth random assignment to a real variable in
in each execution of C(u), and we let τj represent a random variable with this distribution; (v) a
partial function DepExp(u) with domain R ∪ B so that DepExp(u)(r), for r ∈ R, when defined,
is an expression over the random variables τ1, ..., τt where t = NumInd(u), denoting the value of
real variable r in the last state of any execution in C(u), as a function of the independent random
variables τ1, ..., τt; for b ∈ B, DepExp(u)(b) is a comparison expression of the form e1 ∼ e2 where
e1, e2 are expressions over the random variables τ1, ..., τt as defined above; (vi) Cond(u) is a condition
involving the random variables τ1, ..., τj′ where j
′ = NumInd(u) and this is obtained by taking
the conjunction of all the conditions, involving Boolean variables, of conditional branches taken
during the executions in C(u), and substituting each such Boolean variable by the corresponding
expression, given by DepExp.
Probability Spaces on finite executions For each i ≥ 0, we define a probability space Φi =
(Si, Ei, φi) over the set of finite executions of length i. The set Ei of measurable sets of finite
executions of length i, is the σ− algebra generated by the sets of executions in {C(u) |u ∈ Σi}; the
function φi that associates probabilities to the measurable sets in Ei is defined later in this section.
For each i > 0 and each u ∈ Σi, C(u), prob(u), NumInd(u),Param(u), DepExp(u) and
Cond(u) are defined simultaneously inductively on i. The set C(u) has the property that for each
execution α = (s0, ..., sj , ..., si−1) ∈ C(u), disc comp(α) = u.
Let u = u0, ..., ui where i ≥ 0. When i = 0 and u0 = (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fZ), C(u) is the singleton
set having the sequence of unit length (s0) as the only element where s0 = (u0, fR) and fR is the
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function with empty domain , NumInd(u) = 0, Cond(u) = true and Param(u), DepExp(u) are
functions with empty domains; further more, if u0 = dinit then prob(u) = 1, otherwise prob(u) = 0.
Now, consider the case when i > 0, let u′ = u0, ..., ui−1. Clearly, u
′ is a prefix of u and is of length
i. Let ui−1 = (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fZ).
Now, the values of C(u), prob(u), NumInd(u),Param(u), DepExp(u) and Cond(u) are defined
using the corresponding values for u′ and depending on the program statement labeled by ℓ. In
all the cases, we first define the value of prob(u). We define the other values only if prob(u) > 0.
Further more, we define these values only if they differ from the corresponding values for u′.
DOM assignments Let next(ℓ) = {(ℓ′, true)} and let x be the variable being assigned in ℓ. There
are two cases to consider. First, consider the case where x is assigned a value for a DOM expression
e. In this case, prob(u) = prob(u′) if ui = (ℓ
′, fBool, fDOM[x 7→ fDOM(e)], fZ); otherwise prob(u) = 0.
The second case is when x is assigned a random value according to Exp(aǫ, F (x˜), e) or choose(aǫ, e˜).
For d ∈ DOM, let prob(d) be the probability of d (as a function of ǫ) based on the distribution;
note, that these probabilities will depend on the value of fDOM(e) and fDOM(e˜). Then, prob(u) =
prob(u′)prob(d) if for some d ∈ DOM, ui = (ℓ
′, fBool, fDOM[x 7→ d], fZ); otherwise prob(u) = 0. In
both of the cases, C(u) = {αs′ | α ∈ C(u′), last(α) = (ui−1, fR), s
′ = (ui, fR)}.
Integer assignments Let next(ℓ) = {(ℓ′, true)} and let z be the variable being assigned in ℓ.
Again there are two cases to consider. First, consider the case where z is assigned a value for an
integer expression e. Let j = V al(s, e) for any state s such that disc state(s) = ui−1; Note this
value is same for every such state s. In this case, prob(u) = prob(u′) if ui = (ℓ
′, fBool, fDOM, fZ[x 7→
fZ(e)]); otherwise prob(u) = 0. Next, consider the case when z is assigned a random value ac-
cording to DLap(aǫ, e). For j ∈ Z, let prob(j) be the probability assigned to the integer j by
the distribution given by DLap(aǫ, fDOM(e)). Then, prob(u) = prob(u
′)prob(j) if for some j ∈ Z,
ui = (ℓ
′, fBool, fDOM, fZ[x 7→ j]); otherwise prob(u) = 0. In both of the cases, C(u) = {αs
′ | α ∈
C(u′), last(α) = (ui−1, fR), s
′ = (ui, fR)}.
Real assignments Let next(ℓ) = {(ℓ′, true)} and let r be the variable being assigned in ℓ. Now,
prob(u) = prob(u′) if ui = (ℓ
′, fBool, fDOM, fZ); otherwise prob(u) = 0. The other semantic objects
are defined only when prob(u) > 0 and the definitions are based on the following two cases. In the
first case r is assigned a value for a real expression e. In this case case, we have C(u) = {αs′ | α ∈
C(u′), last(α) = (ui−1, fR), s
′ = (ui, fR[r 7→ δ]), δ = V al(last(α), e)}; DepExp(u) is defined so that
DepExp(u)(r′) = DepExp(u′)(r′) for every r′ ∈ R, r′ 6= r, DepExp(u)(r) = f where f is the
expression obtained from e by substituting DepExp(u′)(r′) for every occurrence of r′ in e, for every
r′ ∈ R; for a variable b ∈ B, DepExp(u)(b) = DepExp(u′)(b).
In the second case, r is assigned a random value according to Lap(aǫ, e). In this case, prob(u) =
prob(u′), C(u) = {αs′ | α ∈ C(u′), last(α) = (ui−1, fR), s
′ = (ui, fR[r 7→ δ]), δ ∈ R}; NumInd(u) =
NumInd(u′)+1; Param(u)(j) = Param(u′)(j) for j ≤ NumInd(u′) and Param(u)(NumInd(u′)+
1) = (δ1, δ2) where δ1 = V al(s, e), δ2 = V al(s, aǫ) where s is any state such that discrete state(s) =
ui−1; DepExp(u) is defined so that DepExp(u)(r) = τj where j = NumInd(u), DepExp(u)(r
′) =
DepExp(u′)(r′) when r′ 6= r.
Boolean assignments Again let next(ℓ) = {(ℓ′, true)} and let b be the variable being assigned
in ℓ. Here we consider two cases. The first case is when b is assigned the value of an expression
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e which is either a Boolean expression or a comparison expression of the form e1 ∼ e2 such that
neither of e1, e2 contains an occurrence of a real variable. In this case, prob(u) = prob(u
′) if
ui = (ℓ
′, fBool[b 7→ V al(s, e)], fDOM, fZ), for some state s such that disc state(s) = ui−1, otherwise
prob(u) = 0. Now, C(u) = {αs′|α ∈ C(u′), last(α) = (ui−1, fR), s
′ = (ui, fR)}.We defineDepExp(u)
as follows. Let B′ be the set of b′ ∈ B such that DepExp(u)(b′) is undefined (i.e., value of b′ in ui−1 is
independent of the random variables τ1, ...). If no variable in B−B
′ appears in e then DepExp(u)(b)
is undefined, otherwise DepExp(u)(b) = f ′, where f ′ is the expression obtained from e by replacing
every occurrence of every b′ ∈ B′ by fBool(b
′) and by replacing every occurrence of every b′ ∈
B − B′ by DepExp(u′)(b′). Note that DepExp(u)(b), when defined, is a boolean combination of
comparison expressions involving arithmetic functions of the random variables τ1, ..., τt where t =
NumInd(u). In this case, Cond(u) = Cond(u′). Now, consider the case when e is a comparison
expression e1 ∼ e2 and at least one real variable appears in e1 or e2. Let ui = (ℓ
′′, f ′Bool, f
′
DOM, f
′
Z)
and C1 = {α | α ∈ C(u
′), V al(last(u′), e) = f ′Bool(b)}. Now, prob(u) = prob(u
′) if C1 6= ∅, ℓ
′′ =
ℓ′, f ′Z = fZ, f
′
DOM = fDOM and f
′
Bool(b
′) = fBool(b
′) for all b′ 6= b, otherwise prob(u) = 0. Now,
C(u) = {αs′ | α ∈ C(u′), V al(last(α), e) = f ′Bool(b), last(α) = (ui−1, fR), s
′ = (ui, fR)}; DepExp(u)
is defined so that DepExp(u)(b) = g where g is the comparison expression e′1 ∼ e
′
2 where e
′
j ,
for j = 1, 2, is the expression obtained from ej by substituting every occurence of every real
variable r ∈ R by DepExp(u′)(r) and by substituting every occurrence of every variable x ∈ X , by
fDOM(x).We defiine Cond(u) as follows. If f
′
Bool(b) = true then Cond(u) = Cond(u
′)∧g, otherwsie
Cond(u) = Cond(u′) ∧ ¬(g).
if statement In this case, next(ℓ) = {(ℓ1, c), (ℓ2,¬c)}. Here, with out loss of generality, we
assume that ℓ1 6= ℓ2. As before, let B
′ be the set of b′ ∈ B such that DepExp(u)(b′) is unde-
fined. If ui 6= (ℓ1, fBool, fDOM, fZ) and ui 6= (ℓ2, fBool, fDOM, fZ) then prob(u) = 0. So assume,
ui = (ℓ
′, fBool, fDOM, fZ) where ℓ
′ = ℓ1 or ℓ
′ = ℓ2. Now, if ℓ
′ = ℓ1, then C(u) = {αs
′ | α ∈
C(u′), V al(last(α), c) = true, last(α) = (ui−1, fR), s
′ = (ui, fR)}; otherwise, C(u) = {αs
′ | α ∈
C(u′), V al(last(α), c) = false, last(α) = (ui−1, fR), s
′ = (ui, fR)}; If C(u) = ∅ then prob(u) = 0,
otherwise prob(u) = prob(u′).
While statement Again let next(ℓ) = {(ℓ1, c), (ℓ2,¬c)}. This case is identical to the case of if
statement, and so is skipped.
exit statement In this case, if ui = ui−1 then prob(u) = prob(u
′), C(u) = {αs′ | α ∈ C(u′), s′ =
last(α)} ; otherwise prob(u) = 0.
Semantics For any u ∈ Σi, such that prob(u) > 0, it is the case C(u) 6= ∅. For such a sequence
u, let T (u) = {τj | 1 ≤ j ≤ NumInd(u)}. Let t = NumInd(u). Recall that all the variables
in T (u) are Laplacian distributed random variables whose parameters are given by Param(u).
Now, we interpret a vector (v1, ..., vj , ..., vt) ∈ R
t as a vector of values to the random variables in
T (u), with vj being the value given to τj, for 1 ≤ j ≤ t. For any condition g over the variables
in T (u), for any v ∈ Rt, we write v |= g if the values given by v to variables in T (u) satisfies
g, and we let Sat(g) = {v ∈ Rt | v |= g}. For any C, such that C ⊆ Rt is a Borel set, let
prob(C) be the probability, that the vector of values taken by the random variables in T (u) is a
member of C. Recall that Cond(u) is a Boolean combination of comparison expressions involving
arithmetic functions of the random variables in T (u). It is easily seen that Sat(Cond(u)) ⊆ Rt
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is a Borel set in Rt. Now, we complete the definition of the probability space Φi by defining
φi(C(u)) = prob(u)prob(Sat(Cond(u))).
The following theorem implies that, for each i > 0, Φi is a probability space, and can be proved
by induction on i.
Theorem 18. For every i > 0, for every pair u, u′ ∈ Σi such that u 6= u′, C(u)∩C(u′) = ∅. Further
more,
∑
u∈Σi φi(C(u)) = 1.
Let in be a valuation over input variables and out be a valuation over output variables. We
let Probnatural(Pǫ(in) = out) denote the probability that Pǫ outputs value out on the input in.
We define this probability as follows. Let u = (u0, ..., ui) ∈ Σ
∗ be a discrete execution. We say
that u is a required discrete execution if u is a terminating discrete execution with output out,
i.e., it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) ui = (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fZ) where ℓ is the label of
ext statement and valuation of output variables is out; (ii) ui−1 = (ℓ
′, f ′Bool, f
′
DOM, f
′
int) where ℓ
′ is
not the label of ext statement. Let Req be the set of all required discrete executions. We define
Probnatural(Pǫ(in) = out)) =
∑
u∈Req φ|u|(C(u)), where |u| is the length of u.
C Undecidability of checking differential privacy of Simple pro-
grams
In this section, we will prove Theorem 10. That is, we will show that both Fixed Parameter
Differential Privacy and Differential Privacy are undecidable.
Proof. Recall that a 2-counter Minsky Machine is tuple M = (Q, qs, qf ,∆
1
inc,∆
2
inc,∆
1
jzdec,∆
2
jzdec)
where
• Q is a finite set of control states.
• qs ∈ Q is the initial state.
• qf ∈ Q is the final state.
• ∆iinc ⊆ Q×Q is the increment of counter i for i = 1, 2.
• ∆ijzdec ⊆ Q×Q×Q is the conditional jump of counter i for i = 1, 2.
M is said to be deterministic if from each state q, there is at most one transition out of q.
The semantics of M is defined in terms of a transition system (Conf, (qs, 0, 0),→) where Conf =
Q × N × N is the set of configurations, (qs, 0, 0) is the initial configuration and → is defined as
follows:
(q, i, j) → (q′, i+ 1, j) if (q, q′) ∈ ∆1inc,
(q, i, j) → (q′, i, j + 1) if (q, q′) ∈ ∆2inc,
(q, i, j) → (q′, i, j) if i = 0 and (q, q′, q′′) ∈ ∆1jzdec,
(q, i, j) → (q′′, i− 1, j) if i 6= 0 and (q, q′, q′′) ∈ ∆1jzdec,
(q, i, j) → (q′, i, j) if j = 0 and (q, q′, q′′) ∈ ∆2jzdec, and
(q, i, j) → (q′′, i, j − 1) if j 6= 0 and (q, q′, q′′) ∈ ∆2jzdec.
A sequence of configurations s0, s1, . . . sk is said to be a computation ofM is s0 = (qs, 0, 0) and
si → si+1 for i = 0, 1, . . . k− 1. A computation s0, s1, . . . sk is said to be a terminating computation
of M if sk = (qf , i, j) for some i, j ∈ N.
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We show that given a 2-counter Minsky Machine M, there is a program PMǫ ∈ Simple such
that for each ǫ > 0,
(a) PMǫ has only one Boolean input bin and one Boolean output bout.
(b) PMǫ terminates with probability 1.
(c) PMǫ is (ǫ, 0)-differentially private with respect to the adjacency relation Φ = {(true, false), (false, true)}
if and only if M does not halt.
Given a 2-counter Machine M, PMǫ is constructed as follows. Without loss of generality, let
Q = {q1, . . . , qm} and let q1 be the initial state and qm be the final state. We will model a state
in Q using m Boolean variables b1, . . . , bm. If the current state is qi then bi will be set to true
and all other variables will be set to false. The counters will be modeled using real variables as
follows. Initially a real variable r0 will be sampled from Laplacian distribution. If r0 ≤ 0, we
will exit the program. Otherwise, we will initialize two real variables r1, r2 to be r0. r1, r2 will
model the counters as follows. If the first (second respectively) counter is going to hold natural
number i then r1 = (i + 1)r0 (r2 = (i + 1)r0 respectively). Incrementing the first counter (second
respectively) counter is achieved by adding r0 to r1 (r2 respectively). Decrementing the first counter
(second respectively) counter is achieved by sibtracting r0 from r1 (r2 respectively). For encoding
the transition relations ∆1inc,∆
2
inc,∆
1
jzdec and ∆
2
jzdec, we use variables b
next
1 , . . . , b
next
m , r
next
1 , r
next
2 to
compute the next configuration as expected. For example, the transition (qi, qj , qk) ∈ ∆
1
jzdec can
be encoded using conditional statements as follows:
bi,j,k ← r1 = r0
if (bi,j,k and bi)
then bnextj ← ⊤; b
next
1 ← ⊥; . . . b
next
j−1 ← ⊥; b
next
j+1 ← ⊥; . . . ; b
next
m ← ⊥
else rnext1 ← r1 − r0; b
next
k ← ⊤; b
next
1 ← ⊥; . . . b
next
k−1 ← ⊥; b
next
k+1 ← ⊥; . . . ; b
next
m ← ⊥
end
Let s1, s2, . . . , sn be the statements encoding the transition relation. Consider the program P
M
ǫ
given in Figure 7. The program PMǫ initially samples r0 from a continuous Laplacian distribution.
If the sampled value is ≤ 0 then it outputs false. Otherwise, it starts simulating M. In order to
make sure that the program terminates, we sample another real variable rnumber steps and simulate
k steps of the program where k is the smallest number such that kr0 > rnumber steps.
At the end of the simulation, if the halting state is reached and the input is true then it outputs
true. Otherwise, it outputs false.
Clearly, PMǫ satisfies properties (a) and (b) above. That the program P
M
ǫ has property (c)
above follows from the following observations:
1. If M does not halt then PMǫ outputs false with probability 1.
2. If M halts then PMǫ outputs true with non-zero probability on input true and outputs true
with zero probability on input false.
This shows that Fixed Parameter Differential Privacy is undecidable. Undecidability of Fixed
Parameter Differential Privacy is obtained by taking ǫ0 to be any constant rational number, say
1
2 .
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Input: bin
Output: bout
bout ← false
r0 ← Lap(ǫ, 0)
btest ← r0 > 0
if btest then
rnumber steps ← Lap(ǫ, 0)
rcurr step ← r0
bcontinue ← rnumber steps > rcurr step
b1 ← ⊤
b2 ← ⊥
· · ·
bm ← ⊥
r1 ← r0
r2 ← r0
while bcontinue do
s1
...
sn
b1 ← b
next
1
. . .
bm ← b
next
m
r1 ← r
next
1
r2 ← r
next
2
rcurr step ← r0 + rcurr step
bcontinue ← rnumber steps > rcurr step
end
if (bm and bin) then
bout ← true
end
end
exit
Algorithm 7: Program PMǫ simulating 2-
counter machine M
39
D DTMC Semantics of DiPWhile programs
Let us recall some key restrictions in DiPWhile programs. The first restriction is that real and
integer-valued variables are never assigned within the scope of a while statement. Hence, they are
assigned only a bounded number of times, and therefore, without loss of generality, we can assume
that they are assigned a value exactly once. Second, real valued expressions are never compared
against integer valued expressions.
Let us fix some basic notation. Partial functions from A to B will be denoted as A →֒ B. The
value of f : A →֒ B on a ∈ A, will be denoted as f(a). Two partial functions f and g will be
equal (denoted f ≃ g) if for every element a, either f and g are both undefined, or f(a) = f(b). If
f : A →֒ B, a ∈ A and b ∈ B, then f [a 7→ b] denotes the partial function that agrees with f on all
elements of A except a; on a, f [a 7→ b](a) = b.
In the rest of this section let us fix a DiPWhile program Pǫ. L will denote the set of labels
appearing in Pǫ. A valuation val for DOM variables is a function that assigns a value in DOM to
variables in X ; we will denote set of all such valuations by VDOM. Given a valuation val ∈ VDOM
and a real expression e, val(e) denotes the real expression that results from substituting all the
DOM variables appearing in e by their value in val. Similarly, for an integer expression, val(e)
is the partial evaluation of e with respect to val. Finally, for a comparison e1 ∼ e2 between two
expressions e1 and e2, again we will define val(e1 ∼ e2) to be val(e1) ∼ val(e2). Let us denote the
set of integer expressions, real expressions, and Boolean comparisons, appearing on the right hand
side of assignments in Pǫ by PZ , PR, and PB , respectively. Three sets of expressions will be used
in defining the semantics, and they are as follows.
zExp = {val(e) | val ∈ VDOM, e ∈ PZ}
rExp = {val(e) | val ∈ VDOM, e ∈ PR}
bExp = {val(e) | val ∈ VDOM, e ∈ PB}
Thus, zExp, rExp, and bExp are partially evaluated expression appearing on the right hand side
of assignments in Pǫ. Notice that the sets L, zExp, rExp, and bExp are all finite. Finally, let
Const be the set of rational constants appearing as coefficient of ǫ of Laplace and discrete Laplace
assignments in Pǫ; again Const is finite.
In order to define the semantics of Pǫ, we will use an auxiliary function next that given a
label, identifies the label of the statement to be executed next. Observe that for most program
statements, the next statement to be executed is unique. However, for if and While statements, the
next statement depends on the value of a Boolean expression. We will define next(ℓ) to be a set
of pairs of the form (ℓ′, c) with the understanding that ℓ′ is the next label if c holds. Thus, for a
label ℓ, next(ℓ) will either be {(ℓ′, true)} or {(ℓ1, c), (ℓ2,¬c)}. We do not give a precise definition of
next(·), but we will use it when defining the semantics.
The semantics of Pǫ will given as a finite state, parametrized DTMC [[Pǫ]]. To define the
parametrized DTMC [[Pǫ]], we need to define the states and the transitions.
States States of [[Pǫ]] will be of the form
(ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fint, freal, C).
Informally, ℓ ∈ L is the label of the statement to be executed, fBool, fDOM, fint, and freal are partial
functions assigning “values” to program variables (of appropriate type), and C is a collection of
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inequalities among program variables that hold on the current computational path. Both fBool and
fDOM are valuations for the appropriate set of variables, and so we have fBool : B →֒ {true, false}
and fDOM : X →֒ DOM. For real and integer variables, instead of tracking exact values, we will
track the expressions used in assignments and parameters of (discrete) Laplace mechanisms used
in random assignments. Therefore, we have fint : Z →֒ zExp ∪ (Const × DOM) and freal : R →֒
rExp ∪ (Const×DOM). Finally, C ⊆ bExp ∪ {¬e | e ∈ bExp}. It follows immediately that the set of
states of [[Pǫ]] is finite.
Well Formed States The functions f∗ (for ∗ ∈ {Bool,DOM, int, real}) assign values to program
variables that have been assigned during the computation thus far. Since we assume variables in
DiPWhile program are defined before they are used, if a variable z′ appears in fint(z) ∈ zExp, then
fint(z
′) must be defined. A similar condition holds for real variables. The comparisons in C are
also relationships that must hold on the current path, and so all variables participating in it must
be defined. If a state satisfies these consistency properties between fint, freal, and C, we will say it
is well formed. All reachable states in [[Pǫ]] will be well formed. So when we define transitions we
will assume that the states are well formed.
Initial States Let ℓin be the label of the first statement Pǫ. Let C
in = ∅, and let f inBool, f
in
int,
and f inreal be partial functions with an empty domain. An initial state of [[Pǫ]] will be of the form
(ℓin, f
in
Bool, f
in
DOM, f
in
int, f
in
real, C
in), where f inDOM is defined only on the input variables; the values given
to these variables by f inDOM will be the “initial input value”.
We will now define the semantics of transitions in [[Pǫ]]. Let us fix a state z = (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fint, freal, C).
Transitions out of z will be defined based on describe the effect of executing the statement labeled
ℓ, and so its definition will depend on this statement. We handle each case below.
DOM assignments Let next(ℓ) = {(ℓ′, true)} and let x be the variable being assigned in ℓ. There
are two cases to consider. First, consider the case where x is assigned a value for a DOM expression
e. In this case, [[Pǫ]] will transition to
(ℓ′, fBool, fDOM[x 7→ fDOM(e)], fint, freal, C)
with probability 1. The second case is when x is assigned a random value according to Exp(aǫ, F (x˜), e)
or choose(aǫ, e˜). For d ∈ DOM, let prob(d) be the probability of d (as a function of ǫ) based on
the distribution; note, that these probabilities will depend on the value of fDOM(e) and fDOM(e˜).
Then, [[Pǫ]] will transition to
(ℓ′, fBool, fDOM[x 7→ d], fint, freal, C)
with probability prob(d).
Integer assignments Let next(ℓ) = {(ℓ′, true)} and let z be the variable being assigned in ℓ.
Again there are two cases to consider. First, consider the case where z is assigned a value for an
integer expression e. In this case, [[Pǫ]] will transition to
(ℓ′, fBool, fDOM, fint[z 7→ fDOM(e)], freal, C)
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with probability 1. Next, if z is assigned a random value according to DLap(aǫ, e), then [[Pǫ]]
transitions to
(ℓ′, fBool, fDOM, fint[z 7→ (a, fDOM(e))], freal, C)
with probability 1. Notice that we have a deterministic transition even if the assignment samples
from a discrete Laplace. The effect of choosing randomly a value will get accounted for during
Boolean assignments.
Real assignments Let next(ℓ) = {(ℓ′, true)} and let r be the variable being assigned in ℓ. First,
if z is assigned a value for a real expression e, [[Pǫ]] will transition to
(ℓ′, fBool, fDOM, fint, freal[r 7→ fDOM(e)], C)
with probability 1. If z is assigned a random value according to Lap(aǫ, e), then [[Pǫ]] transitions to
(ℓ′, fBool, fDOM, fint, freal[r 7→ (a, fDOM(e))], C)
with probability 1. Again sampling according to Laplace is modeled deterministically.
Boolean assignments Again let next(ℓ) = {(ℓ′, true)} and let b be the variable being assigned
in ℓ. When b is assigned the value of Boolean expression e, [[Pǫ]] transitions to
(ℓ′, fBool[b 7→ fBool(e)], fDOM, fint, freal, C)
with probability 1. The interesting case is when b is assigned the result of comparing expressions
e1 ∼ e2. If the probability of all conditions in C holding is 0, then let p1 be 0. Otherwise, let p1
denote the probability of fDOM(e1) ∼ fDOM(e2) holding given all conditions in C hold; notice that
this probability depends on the functions fint and freal that store the parameters to various random
sampling steps. Now [[Pǫ]] will transition to
(ℓ′, fBool[b 7→ true], fDOM, fint, freal, C ∪ {fDOM(e1) ∼ fDOM(e2)})
with probability p1, and it will transition to
(ℓ′, fBool[b 7→ false], fDOM, fint, freal, C ∪ {¬(fDOM(e1) ∼ fDOM(e2))})
with probability 1− p1. The effect of the probabilistic sampling steps for integer and real variables
gets accounted for when the result of a comparison is assigned to a Boolean variable.
if statement In this case, next(ℓ) = {(ℓ1, c), (ℓ2,¬c)}. If fBool(c) = true then we transition to
(ℓ1, fBool, fDOM, fint, freal, C)
with probability 1. On the other hand, if fBool(c) = false then transition to
(ℓ2, fBool, fDOM, fint, freal, C)
with probability 1.
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While statement Again let next(ℓ) = {(ℓ1, c), (ℓ2,¬c)}. This case is identical to the case of if
statement, and so is skipped.
exit statement In this case we stay in state z with probability 1.
Equivalence of the two semantics Let in be a valuation over input variables and out be a
valuation over output variables. We let ProbDTMC(Pǫ(in) = out) denote the probability that Pǫ
outputs value out, on the input in, under the DTMC semantics. This probability is defined to be
the probability of reaching a state of the form (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fint, freal, C) where ℓ is the label of an
exit statement and fDOM assigns the values given by out to output variables, from an initial state
in which the values of the input variables is given by in, in the DTMC [[Pǫ]]. The following theorem
states the equivalence of the natural semantics given in Section B to that of the DTMC semantics
for DiPWhile programs.
Theorem 19. For every ǫ > 0 and DiPWhile program Pǫ, for every pair of evaluations in, out to
the input and output variables respectively, ProbDTMC(Pǫ(in) = out) = Probnatural(Pǫ(in) = out).
Proof Sketch. Fix an ǫ > 0. Consider a discrete execution u = u0, ..., ui of Pǫ starting from an initial
discrete state u0, as given by the natural semantics of Section B, such that prob(u) > 0, where uj =
(ℓj , f
j
DOM, f
j
Bool, f
j
Z) for 0 ≤ j ≤ i. We call such an execution as an initialized proper execution of Pǫ.
It can be shown that there exists a unique path p = p0, ..., pi in the DTMC [[Pǫ]] corresponding to
every such initialized execution of Pǫ such that the state pj = (ℓj , f
j
DOM, f
j
Bool, f
j
int, f
j
real, Cj) for some
f jint, f
j
real, C. Now let g be a function mapping initialized proper executions of Pǫ to corresponding
paths in [[Pǫ]], as specified above. For any path p in the DTMC [[Pǫ]], let prob(p) denote the product
of the probabilities of all the transitions in p. We call it an initialized proper path if it starts with
an initial state and prob(p) > 0. Now consider any proper path p = p0, ..., pi in [[Pǫ]]. It can be
easily shown that prob(p) =
∑
u∈g−1(p) φi+1(C(u)), where φi+1 is the probability function and C(u)
is the set of executions, defined in section B. Now, the theorem follows from this observation and
the definitions of ProbDTMC(Pǫ(in) = out) and Probnatural(Pǫ(in) = out).
Complexity Now, we bound the size of the state space of DTMC [[Pǫ]] as follows. Let m =
|DOM| = 2Nmax + 1 and m
′ be the length of Pǫ. Let n1, n2, n3, n4, respectively, be the number
DOM variables, boolean variables, integer variables, and real variables occurring in Pǫ. In a state s
of MP , the number of possible values for fdom is ≤ m
n1 , the number of possible values for fbool is
≤ 2n2 . The number of possible values for fint can be bounded as follows. An integer variable can
be assigned a Laplacian distribution whose parameters are pairs of the form (aǫ, e) where e is an
expression over variables in U ∩ X ; the number of such pairs is ≤ m1m
n1 where m1 is the number
of values of a in P and mn1 is the bound on the number of values of e. An integer variable can also
be assigned a linear expression over integer variables with coefficients that are integer constants
or expressions over DOM variables; the number of such linear combinations is ≤ m2m
n1 where
m2 is the number of such expressions appearing in P . Since, m1 +m2 ≤ m
′, we see that number
of values that an integer variable can be mapped to is ≤ m′mn1 . Hence the number of possible
values for fint is ≤ (m
′mn1)n3 . By a similar reasoning we observe that the number of possible
values for freal is ≤ (m
′mn1)n4 . Now we bound the number of values for C as follows. The only
places where comparisons appear are on the right hand sides of assignments to boolean variables.
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In each such assignment we have comparisons over linear expressions of integer and real variables
; such comparisons also have integer constants and DOM variables appearing in them. Since the
number of integer constants is ≤ m′ and the number of valuations to DOM variables ≤ mn1 , we
get that the number of possible comparions is ≤ m′mn1 . Since C is a subset of such comparisons,
the number of possible values for C is ≤ 2(m
′mn1 ). Now, the number of states is bounded by the
product of possible values to each component of a state, which is seen to be O(2n.nn1+n2+n3+n4)
where n = m′mn1 .
E DiPWhile programs are finite, definable, parametrized DTMCs
We show the proof of Theorem 13, namely that for any DiPWhile program Pǫ, [[Pǫ]] is a finite,
definable, parametrized DTMC.
Proof. From our definition of the semantics (Appendix B), it follows that [[Pǫ]] is a finite param-
eterized DTMC. We now show that it is definable also. In order to show this, we have to show
that the transition probabilities of [[Pǫ]] are definable. Observe that, by definition, the transition
probabilities of choose(aǫ, E˜) construct are definable. The other probabilistic transitions arise as
a result of comparison between random variables of the same sort or from using the exponential
mechanism. These transition probabilities turn out to be from a special class of definable functions.
We define this form next.
Definition 20. Let p(ǫ) =
∑m
i=1 aiǫ
nieǫqi where each ai is a rational number, ni is a natural number
and qi is a non-negative rational number. We shall call all such expressions pseudo-polynomials in
ǫ. Given a real number b > 0 and a pseudo-polynomial p(ǫ), p(b) is the real number obtained by
substituting b for ǫ. The ratio of two pseudo-polynomials in ǫ, p1(ǫ)p2(ǫ) , shall be called a pseudo-rational
function in ǫ if p2(b) 6= 0 for all real b > 0. Given a real number b > 0 and a pseudo-rational function
rt(ǫ) = p1(ǫ)p2(ǫ) , rt(b) is defined to be
p1(b)
p2(b)
.
Observe that a pseudo-rational function rt defines a function frt from the set of strictly positive
reals to the set of reals. We will henceforth confuse frt with rt. Pseudo-rational functions are easily
seen to be closed under addition and multiplication.
Proposition 21. Each pseudo-rational function rt is definable in the theory Thexp.
Proof. Let rt(ǫ) =
∑m
i=1 aiǫ
nieǫqi
∑m′
i=1 a
′
iǫ
n′
ieǫq
′
i
. Let N be the least common multiple of all denominators of qi, q
′
i.
Let pi = qiN and p
′
i = q
′
iN. Let a be the least common multiple of all denominators of ai, a
′
i. Let
bi = aai and b
′
i = aa
′
i. It is easy to see that rt is definable by the formula φ(x) :
φ(x) ≡ ∀z.((x
m′∑
i=1
b′iǫ
n′izp
′
i =
m∑
i=1
biǫ
nizpi) ∧ (zN = eǫ) ∧ (z > 0)).
Note that in the above formula, z is the Nth root of ǫ.
Now, it follows from our restriction on our scoring functions, namely that they take values in
rationals, that the transition probabilities in exponential mechanism are pseudo-rational functions
that can be computed.
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Let us now consider the case of comparison between random variables. Let state = (ℓ, fBool, fDOM, fint, freal, C)
of [[Pǫ]] be a state of [[Pǫ]]. Recall that when we compare random variables in state, we add a new
linear comparison e to C. Further, in order to compute transition probabilities, we compute the
conditional probability that the set of linear comparison C ∪ e is true given that C is true. For
this, it suffices to show that we can compute the probability that the set of linear comparisons C
is true and the probability C ∪ e is true. We make the following observations:
• Since every random variable must be defined before it is used, we can simplify C and C ∪ e
to only refer to program variables that were used in random assignments.
• All our random assignments sample from independent random variables. Since we never
compare integer and real random variables, it suffices to compute the probability that a
system of linear comparisons over integers with integer coefficients hold and the probability
that a system of linear comparisons over reals with rational coefficients hold. We will now
show that these probabilities can be computed and are pseudo-rational functions.
• In order to compute the probability that a system of linear comparisons over reals with
rational coefficients hold, we only need to consider systems of linear inequalities. Clearly any
equality u1 = u2 can be written as two inequalities, u1 ≤ u2 and u2 ≤ u1. If a comparison
in C is u1 6= u2 then we can consider the systems C1 = (C \ {u1 6= u2}) ∪ {u1 < u2} and
C2 = (C \ {u1 6= u2}) ∪ {u2 < u1}, compute probabilities of C1 and C2 separately and add
them up to compute the probability that C holds. Thus, without loss of generality we can
assume that C consists of only linear inequalities.
Probability of system of linear inequalities over integers. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn) be a
discrete random variable taking values in Zn. Consider a finite system of linear inequalities C with
integer coefficients and with n unknowns Z1, . . . , Zn. A solution of C is a tuple b = (b1, . . . , bn) ∈ Z
n
such that all inequalities in C are satisfied when each Zj ∈ C is replaced by bj. Let sol(C) ⊆ Z
n
denote the set of all solutions of C. The probability that Z satisfies C is said to be the probability
of the event E = {Z = b | b is a solution of C}. We denote this probability by Prob(Z |= C). We
have the following:
Lemma 22. Let C be a finite system of linear inequalities with integer coefficients and with n
unknowns Z1, . . . , Zn. Let Zj = DLap(ajǫ, µ1), . . ., Zn = DLap(anǫ, µn) be mutually independent
discrete Laplacians such that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, aj is a strictly positive rational number and
µj is an integer. Let Z = (Z1, . . . , Zn). There is a pseudo-rational function rtZ,C in ǫ such that
Prob(Z |= C) = rtZ,C . The function rtZ,C can be computed from C, (a1, µ1), . . . , (an, µn).
Proof. For, each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, consider Yj = DLap(ajǫ, 0). It is easy to see that Zj has the same
distribution as Yj + µj. Now consider the system of inequalities C
′ in which each Zj is replaced by
Yj+µj. Let Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn). It is easy to see that Prob(Z |= C) = Prob(Y |= C
′). This observation
implies that it suffices to prove the Lemma in the special case that each µj = 0. Thus, for the rest
of the proof we assume that each µj = 0.
Now, consider a set pos ⊆ {1, . . . , n}. Let Cpos be the system of inequalities C ∪ {Zj ≥ 0 | j ∈
pos} ∪ {Zj < 0 | j 6∈ pos}. It is easy to see that the set of solutions of C is the disjoint union
∪{pos⊆1,...,n}Cpos. Thus, it suffices to the prove that for each pos ⊆ {1, . . . , n}, Prob(Z |= Cpos) is a
pseudo-rational function that can be computed.
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Consider the system of inequalities C ′pos obtained from Cpos by replacing each Zj by Yj for
j ∈ pos and by −Yj for j 6∈ pos. Let Y = (Y1, . . . , Yn). From the fact that Laplacians are symmetric
distributions, it follows each Yj has the same distribution as Zj. Thus, Prob(Z |= Cpos) = Prob(Y |=
C ′pos). Observe that the set of solutions of C
′
pos are a subset of N
n. Without loss of generality, we
can also assume that the terms in each inequality of C ′pos are rearranged so that the constant terms
in C ′pos and the coefficients of the variables Yj are natural numbers, ie, non-negative integers.
Therefore, C ′pos is a system of linear inequalities with natural number coefficients. We are
interested in solutions of C ′pos over natural numbers. For such system of inequalities, the set of
solutions can be written as a disjoint union of simple linear sets [12]; a set S ⊆ Nn is said to be
linear if there are tuples b0, p1, . . . , pm ∈ N
n such that S = {b0 +
∑m
i=1 kipi | for each i, ki ∈ N}
and simple if each b ∈ S has a unique representation as a sum b0 +
∑m
i=1 kipi. b0 is said to be
the offset of S and p1, . . . , pm the periods of S. From the fact that the set of solutions of C
′
pos
can be written as a disjoint union of simple linear sets, it follows that it suffices to show that
Prob(Y ∈ S | S is simple linear) is a pseudo-rational function in ǫ. In order to show this we need a
couple of additional notations.
For two n-tuples x = (x1, . . . , xn) and y = (y1, . . . , yn), x · y will denote the sum
∑n
j=1 xjyj.
Secondly, we will denote the tuple (a1, . . . , an) by a.
Fix a simple semilinear set S. Let b0 be its offset and p1, . . . , pm its periods. Let κ =
∏n
i=1
1−e−aiǫ
1+e−aiǫ
.
From the fact that each b ∈ S has a unique representation as a sum b0 +
∑m
i=1 kipi, it follows that
Prob(Y ∈ S) =
∑
k1∈N
· · ·
∑
km∈N
Prob(Y = b0 +
∑m
i=1 kipi)
=
∑
k1∈N
· · ·
∑
km∈N
κ e−ǫ(b0·a+k1p1·a+···+kmpm·a)
= κ (e−ǫb0·a)(
∑
k1∈N
e−ǫk1p1·a) · · · (
∑
km∈N
e−ǫkmp1·a)
= κ (e−ǫb0·a)( 1
1−e−ǫp1·a
) · · · ( 1
1−e−ǫpm·a
)
The latter is clearly a pseudo-rational function in ǫ.
Probability of system of linear inequalities over reals. Let R = (R1, . . . , Rn) be a contin-
uous random variable taking values in Rn. Consider a finite system of linear inequalities C with
rational coefficients and with n unknowns R1, . . . , Rn. As in the case of discrete random variables ,
we can define sol(C) ⊆ Rn, the set of solutions, and Prob(R |= C), the probability that R satisfies
C. We have the following result.
Lemma 23. Let C be a finite system of linear inequalities with rational coefficients and with n
unknowns R1, . . . , Rn. Let R1 = Lap(a1ǫ, µ1), . . ., Rn = Lap(anǫ, µn) be mutually independent
Laplacian doistributions such that for each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, aj is a strictly positive rational number and
µj is a rational number. Let R = (R1, . . . , Rn). There is a pseudo-rational function rtR,C in ǫ such
that Prob(R |= C) = rtR,C . The function rtR,C can be computed from C, (a1, µ1), . . . , (an, µn).
Proof. As in the proof of Lemma 22, it suffices to consider the case when each µi = 0 and to show
that the probability measure of the set Sol = sol(C) ∩ {(b1, . . . , bn) | bi ∈ R
>0} is a computable
pseudo-rational function.
Since R is continuous, we can also assume that each inequality is of the form ≤ . This is because
the measure of any set in Rn that satisfies a linear equation over n unknowns R1, . . . , Rn is 0. There
are computable finite sets S1, . . . , Sm such that (See [9])
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1. Sol = S1 ∪ . . . Sm,
2. The measure of the Si ∩ Sj is 0 for i 6= j, and
3. Each Si is a positive repetitive polyhedra. S ⊆ (R
>0)n is said to be a positive repetitive poly-
hedra if there are constants h−0 , h
+
0 and functions h
−
1 (x1), h
+
1 (x1), h
−
2 (x1, x2), h
+
2 (x1, x2), . . . , h
−
n−1(x1, x2, . . . xn−1), h
+
n−1(x1, x2, . . . xn−1)
such that
• Si =
{(x1, . . . , xn) | h
−
0 ≤ x1 ≤ h
+
0 , . . . ,
h−n−1(x1, . . . xn−1) ≤ xn ≤ h
+
n−1(x1, . . . xn−1)}.
• h−0 is a rational number ≥ 0.
• h+0 is either ∞ or a rational number.
• For each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, h−j is a linear function in its arguments. In the latter case, h
−
j has
rational coefficients.
• For each 1 ≤ j ≤ n, h+j is either∞ or a linear function in its arguments. h
+
j has rational
coefficients in the latter case.
Thanks to conditions (1) and (2) above, it suffices to show that for any positive repetitive polyhedra
S, the probability measure of the event {R = b | b ∈ S} is a pseudo-rational function.
Fix S and let h−0 , h
+
0 , h
−
1 , h
+
1 , . . . , h
−
n−1, h
+
n−1 be as above, The measure of the event {R = b | b ∈
S} can be computed using the nested integral
F =
∫ h+
0
h−
0
fa1(x1)
∫ h+
1
h−
1
fa2(x2) · · ·
∫ h+n−1
h−n−1
fan(xn) dxn · · · dx1
where fai(xi) =
aiǫ
2 e
−aiǫx is the pdf of Ri (we always have that xi ≥ 0) and the arguments of h
+
i , h
−
i
are omitted for readability.
For 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let Ij be the nested integral
Ij =
∫ h+j−1
h−j−1
faj (xj) · · ·
∫ h+n−1
h−n−1
fan(xn) dxn · · · dxj .
We claim by induction on k = n− j that Ij is a finite sum of terms of the form
aǫmebǫ(xm11 e
ǫb1x1) . . . (x
mj−1
j−1 e
ǫbj−1xj−1)
where a, b, b1, . . . , bj−i are rational numbers (including negative numbers), m is an integer, and
m1, . . . ,mj−1 are natural numbers. We will assume that the sum is always presented in simplest
form, namely, that all cancellations have already taken place in the sum.
Clearly the claim is true when k = 0. Suppose that the claim is true for k = k0. Let j0 = n−k0.
Suppose
w = aǫmebǫ(xm11 e
ǫb1x1) . . . (x
mj0−1
j0−1
eǫbj0−1xj0−1)
is a summand in Ij0 . Let k = k0 + 1 and j = n− k = n− k0 − 1 = j0 − 1.
Consider the indefinite integral
J =
∫
faj0−1w dxj0−1
=
∫ aj0−1ǫ
2 e
−aj0−1ǫw dxj0−1
=
aj0−1
2 ǫ
m+1ebǫ(xm11 e
ǫb1x1) . . . (x
mj0−2
j0−2
eǫbj0−2xj0−2)∫
x
mj0−1
j0−1
eǫ(bj0−1−aj0−1)xj0−1dxj0−1
47
Let
J ′ =
∫
x
mj0−1
j0−1
eǫ(bj0−1−aj0−1)xj0−1dxj0−1.
Now, if bj0−1 − aj0−1 = 0 then
J ′ =
x
mj0−1+1
j0−1
mj0−1+1
.
If bj0−1 − aj0−1 6= 0 then by doing a change of variables t = (bj0−1 − aj0−1)ǫx, it is not too hard to
show that
J ′ =
mj0−1∑
k=0
ckǫ
tkxkj0−1e
ǫ(bj0−1−aj0−1)xj0−1
where ck is a rational number and tk an integer for each k.
Thus, the indefinite integeral J is a sum, each of whose terms is of the form
a′ǫm
′
eb
′ǫ(x
m′
1
1 e
ǫb′1x1) . . . (x
m′j0−1
j0−1
e
ǫb′j0−1
xj0−1).
If h−j0−2 and h
+
j0−2
are linear functions, we get immediately that Ij =
∫ h+j0−2
h−j0−2
faj0−1w dxj0−1 is of the
right form. The induction step follows in this case.
If h+j0−2 =∞, and each bj in a summand of J is strictly negative, then it is also easy to see that
the induction step follows. Apriori, it seems that there might be a problem when bj ≥ 0 as in this
case, Ij will evaluate to either ∞ or −∞. This, however, will contradict the fact that the nested
integral F defines probability of an event (and hence is bounded above by 1). Thus, if h+j0−2 =∞
then bj must be strictly negative.
The claim immediately implies that the Sol = sol(C) ∩ {(b1, . . . , bn) | bi ∈ R
>0} is a pseudo-
rational function.
F Psuedo-codes for examples in experimental evavaluation
The pseudocode for the six variants of SVT are given in Figures 5 and 6.
The pseudocode for the Nosiy Max algorithms can be found in Figure 7.
The pseudocode for NoisyHistogram algorithms can be found in Figure 8.
48
(SVT1) First Instantiation of SVT
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
rT ← Lap(
ǫ
2∆ , T )
count← 0
for i← 1 to N do
r← Lap( ǫ4c∆ , q[i])
b← r ≥ rT
if b then
out[i]← ⊤
count← count+ 1
if count ≥ c then
exit
end
else
out[i]← ⊥
end
end
(SVT2) Second Instantiation of SVT
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
rT ← Lap(
ǫ
2c∆ , T )
count← 0
for i← 1 to N do
r← Lap( ǫ4c∆ , q[i])
b← r ≥ rT
if b then
out[i]← ⊤, rT ← Lap(
ǫ
2c∆ , T )
count← count+ 1
if count ≥ c then
exit
end
else
out[i]← ⊥
end
end
Figure 5: Sparse Vector Technique Algorithms
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(SVT3) Third Instantiation of SVT
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
rT ← Lap(
ǫ
2∆ , T )
count← 0
for i← 1 to N do
r← Lap( ǫ2c∆ , q[i])
b← r ≥ rT
if b then
out[i]← Discseq(r)
count← count+ 1
if count ≥ c then
exit
end
else
out[i]← ⊥
end
end
(SVT4) Fourth Instantiation of SVT
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
rT ← Lap(
ǫ
4∆ , T )
count← 0
for i← 1 to N do
r← Lap( 3ǫ4∆ , q[i])
b← r ≥ rT
if b then
out[i]← ⊤
count← count+ 1
if count ≥ c then
exit
end
else
out[i]← ⊥
end
end
(SVT5) Fifth Instantiation of SVT
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
rT ← Lap(
ǫ
2∆ , T )
for i← 1 to N do
r← q[i]
b← r ≥ rT
if b then
out[i]← ⊤
else
out[i]← ⊥
end
end
(SVT6) Sixth Instantiation of SVT
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
rT ← Lap(
ǫ
2∆ , T )
for i← 1 to N do
r← Lap( ǫ2∆ , q[i])
b← r ≥ rT
if b then
out[i]← ⊤
else
out[i]← ⊥
end
end
Figure 6: Sparse Vector Technique Algorithms
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(NMax1) Correct Noisy Max with Laplacian
Noise
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out
NoisyVector ← []
for i← 1 to N do
NoisyVector[i] ← Lap( ǫ2 , q[i])
end
out ← argmax(NoisyVector)
(NMax2) Correct Noisy Max with Exponential
Noise
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out
NoisyVector ← []
for i← 1 to N do
NoisyVector[i] ← Lap+( ǫ2 , q[i])
end
out ← argmax(NoisyVector)
(NMax3) Incorrect Noisy Max with Laplacian
Noise
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out
NoisyVector ← []
for i← 1 to N do
NoisyVector[i] ← Lap( ǫ2 , q[i])
end
out ← Discseq(max(NoisyVector))
(NMax4) Incorrect Noisy Max with Laplacian
Noise
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out
NoisyVector ← []
for i← 1 to N do
NoisyVector[i] ← Lap+( ǫ2 , q[i])
end
out ← Discseq(max(NoisyVector))
Figure 7: Noisy Max Algorithms
(Hist1) Noisy Histogram
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
NoisyVector ← []
for i← 1 to N do
NoisyVector[i] ← Lap(ǫ, q[i])
end
out ← Discseq(NoisyVector)
(Hist2) Noisy Histogram, Wrong Scale
Input: q[1 : N ]
Output: out[1 : N ]
NoisyVector ← []
for i← 1 to N do
NoisyVector[i] ← Lap(1ǫ , q[i])
end
out ← Discseq(NoisyVector)
Figure 8: Noisy Histogram Algorithms
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